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In the late 1990s, The Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS, 
Pan Malaysian Islamic Party), Parti KeADILan Nasional (KeADILan, National Justice 
Party) and the Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM, Malaysian People’s Party) came together to 
form the Barisan Alternatif (BA, Alternative Front). This coalition of Malaysia’s main 
opposition political parties aimed to provide an alternative government to the ruling 
grand coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front). The establishment of the BA by 
the opposition political parties in Malaysia was a breakaway from conventional 
expectation of the opposition. This research is a study of the DAP and their involvement 
in the formation of the oppositional coalition and their eventual exit from the BA in 2001. 
 
The DAP in reading the political developments in the late 1990s, felt that it was a 
moment of opportunity to check on the hegemonic powers on the ruling BN regime. The 
DAP and PAS, fellow members in the opposition camp were willing to set aside their 
ideological differences to work towards the creation of a viable alternative government to 
that of the BN. On the onset of the 1999 General Elections, the BA did in fact appear to 
be a formidable force. However, the inroads made by the opposition proved to favour 
PAS who expounded an Islamic position on their electoral campaign despite consenting 
to the secular joint political manifesto of the BA. 
 
While the DAP was upset with their relatively dismal performance and the failure of the 
opposition coalition to deny the incumbent BN its two-thirds majority in Parliament, 
were faced by a larger issue of confronting the PAS’ Islamic agenda. Committed to the 
 vi 
vision of a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic state in Malaysia, the DAP was unable to 
resolve their differences with PAS over the issue of the establishment of an Islamic state 
and governance in Malaysia. Moreover, differences between the DAP and other 
opposition parties in the BA, namely KeADILan were also important factors that 
compelled the DAP to leave the opposition coalition in 2001. This study concludes that 
the DAP and the opposition coalition is merely a simple association for political 
convenience. Long term political collaborations between the opposition parties in 
Malaysia is unlikely as the traditional challenge of communal politics remain in place.  
 
This research employs a synthesis of the dominant contemporary theories of coalition 
building, namely numerical based theories and policy based theories of coalition building 
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Democratic Action Party of Malaysia and the Politics of 




 On September 2, 1998, the then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar 
Ibrahim, was sacked from the government. Upon his dismissal, Anwar launched the 
Reformasi movement which called for reforms in governance. Set amidst the backdrop of 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the ‘Anwar saga’ and the chanting of ‘Reformasi’, a new 
political coalition came to birth in Malaysia. 
 
The Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS, Pan Malaysian 
Islamic Party), Parti KeADILan Nasional (KeADILan, National Justice Party) and the 
Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM, Malaysian People’s Party) came together to form the 
Barisan Alternatif (BA, Alternative Front). This coalition of Malaysia’s main opposition 
political parties aimed to provide an alternative government to the ruling grand coalition, 
Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front). The BA, formed in September 1999, competed in 
the November 1999 General Elections. Though the BA failed to deny the BN from 
forming the government, it performed sufficiently well to erode the margins of victory 
from the incumbent BN. However, this opposition coalition began to unravel by 2001 as 
the DAP exited from the BA. Although the BA continues to exist, the loss of the DAP 




Coalitions as defined by William A. Gamson, “are temporary, means oriented alliances 
among individuals or groups which differ in goals.”1 Bruce Beuno de Mesquita on the 
other hand, postulates that coalitions are groups of individuals or groups “who share at 
least one goal and who agree to pool at least some of their resources in pursuit of that 
shared goal.”2 In a preliminary overview of coalition theories, the common assumption in 
the discussion of coalitions is that each individual in a coalition has a desire or objective 
but lacks the necessary resources or materials to achieve that particular desire 
independently. Thus it is in their interest to seek out potential partners who are willing to 
cooperate together to achieve their individual desires or to craft an attainable common 
objective that may enhance the probability of each individual member to achieve their 
distinct goals and objectives in the long run. This leads to the questions of when and how 
do coalitions form? What are the factors that encourage or hinder coalition formation? 
How do individuals or groups identify and select potential coalition partners?  
 
The quest to attain any goal is fundamentally a competition and what matters most in a 
competition are the prizes at stake, the competitors and the arena of competition. The 
value of the prize will influence the amount of resources that one is willing to commit, 
while the range of competitors and arena of competition will hold sway on the limits and 
choices of strategies. In the case of formal political competition, the prize for victory is 
political office. Political parties compete against each other within a political system 
characterized by the state constitution, electoral laws and local norms. In instances where 
                                                 
1
 William A. Gamson, “ A Theory of Coalition Formation” American Sociological Review, Vol. 26 No.3, p. 
374. 
2
 Bruce Beuno de Mesquita, Strategy, risk, and personality in coalition politics : the case of India 
(Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1975) p.3. 
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no single party can dominate elections, then greater are the possibilities of coalitions 
coming into being in the hope of gathering sufficient votes to form the government of the 
day.3 It is in the interest of political scientists and observers to postulate on the various 
possibilities and patterns of cooperation and contestation when such situations manifest. 
 
In the case of Malaysia, political party coalitions have been in existence even in the days 
before independence. The ruling BN and its predecessor, the Alliance, is a composite of 
political parties that represents the 3 main ethnic groups in Malaysia, then Malaya. This 
coalition has expanded over the years to include many smaller political parties. Although 
there have been movements of political parties in and out of the BN coalition, the United 
Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and 
the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) remain as the core of BN. As their names suggest, 
these 3 main component parties hail from their own respective ethnic community and it is 
this formula of cooperation between UMNO, MCA and MIC that has enabled the BN to 
dominate Malaysian political elections. 
 
Though political coalitions are not new occurrences in Malaysia, the establishment of an 
opposition coalition consisting of the major oppositional political parties of the day 
heralds a new chapter in Malaysian politics. The formation of the BA in 1999 as an 
alternative to BN is no surprise at first glance. It has been the established understanding 
that, if a winning coalition is to be formed, then the ethnic composition of coalition must 
reflect the realities of the Malaysian political landscape. A multi-ethnic coalition, 
anchored by a Malay political party, PAS, the BA closely mirrored the composition of the 
                                                 
3
 Ibid.,  p. 4. 
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BN if one is determined to view each BA party as being an ethnic party.  While the MCA 
represented Chinese communal interest in the BN, the DAP, although claiming to be 
multiracial in its membership, was seen as the ‘Chinese’ party in the BA. However, in 
1999, each opposition party could claim to be non-ethnic in ideology and practice, at least 
to the extent that differentiated them from the BN component parties. Nonetheless, the 
enigma of the opposition coalition is ironically the juxtaposition of the DAP and the PAS 
on the same electoral platform. DAP being secular in its ideology has in the past, refused 
to be closely associated with the PAS, which has continually pushed for the creation of an 
Islamic state and governance in Malaysia. 
 
Why then did the DAP choose to involve itself in the formation of an opposition coalition 
and cooperate with PAS between the period of 1999 to 2001? What are the factors that 
facilitated cross communal cooperation between the Malaysian opposition parties? What 
prompted the DAP to enter into the opposition coalition in 1999 and to walk out of the 
opposition coalition in 2001? And these are the research questions which this study 
attempts to answer. The purpose of this research is to study the DAP’s involvement in the 
formation of the BA coalition. It is the objective of this research to uncover the 
motivations that compel the DAP to engage in coalition building especially with its 
ideological opposite the PAS. The DAP has always maintained a secular ideology and 
this is in contrast with the PAS’ Islamic orientation towards politics. However, the DAP’s 
membership in the opposition coalition was short lived and this leads to the logical 
extension of the study to include the exit of the DAP from the BA. An early exit could be 
due to either the flaws in coalition building, hence the inevitability of parting, or the rise 
 5 
of a new variable that pushes the DAP away from the BA. Only by looking at both the 
formation and the exit of the DAP from the BA, can a comprehensive study of the DAP’s 
involvement in opposition coalition building be obtained.  
 
The establishment of the BA defies the prevailing expectations of Malaysian oppositional 
political parties in the 1990s. Malaysia has been described as a syncretic state, “a product 
of a particular historical-structural configuration.”4 James Jesudason postulates that as a 
result of colonialism, the inheritors of the Malayan state are enabled “to combine a broad 
array of economic, ideological and coercive elements in managing the society.”5 Since 
independence in 1957, UMNO and its political allies, namely the MCA and MIC have 
had an unbroken grip over political power under the banner of the coalition of the 
Alliance and its successor, BN. With a broad base appeal, the BN has dominated the 
centre of politics, pushing opposition political parties to the periphery of Malaysian 
society. Political opposition and in particular opposition political parties are unable to 
provide an alternative to the ruling regime as the BN is able to accommodate the diverse 
interest and ideological orientations of society. Thus, the opposition political parties 
operate predominantly at the fringes of society, often catering to a narrow political 
cleavage. Moreover, the major opposition political parties each appeal to different 
segments of society, and due to party ideology and objectives, opposition political parties 
are polarized from one another. 
 
                                                 
4
 James V. Jesudason “The syncretic state and the structuring of oppositional politics in Malaysia” in Garry 
Rodan (ed.) Political opposition in industrializing Asia (London ; New York : Routledge, 1996) p. 129 
5
 Ibid., p. 129. 
 6 
The leading Malaysian political party, UMNO, has often experienced “chronic 
occurrences of strenuous conflicts and friction within its ranks.”6 In the late 1980s, intra 
party factionalism in UMNO resulted in the split up of UMNO into UMNO Baru and 
Semangat 46 (Spirit of 46). The splinter group, Semangat 46, under the leadership of 
Tengku Razaleigh, managed to establish two separate electoral alliances with the 
prominent opposition parties of the day. Semangat 46 entered into coalition talks with 
PAS and two other minor Malay political parties, Berjasa and Hamim.7 As a result, the 
Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU) was established on 5 June 1990.8 Separate coalition 
talks were held between Semangat 46 with the DAP and a minor Indian based political 
party, the All-Malaysia Indian Progressive Front (IPF) to form an electoral alliance. On 
11 October 1990, the Gagasan Rakyat (People’s Movement) was established with its 
component members being the DAP, IPF and Semangat 46. Both APU and Gagasan 
Rakyat fell short of being coalitions as defined by either Gamson or de Mesquita due to 
the degree of shared resources, and as observed by Harold Crouch, resembled more as 
“semi-alliances of opposition parties”9 
  
The cause for the establishment of two separate electoral alliances rather than the creation 
of a single unified opposition front is commonly attributed to the inability of the PAS and 
                                                 
6
 Hussin Mutalib, “Factionalism in UMNO” (Unpublished academic thesis, University of Singapore, 1977) 
p. 115. 
7
 Gordon P. Means, “Malaysia in 1989” Southeast Asia Affairs 1990 ( Singapore : Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1990) p. 190 
8
 Edward Terence Gomes, “Malaysia” in Wolfgang Sachsenröder and Ulrike E. Frings (eds.) Political party 
systems and democratic development in East and Southeast Asia Vol.1 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998) p.241-
242. 
9
 Harold Crouch, “Malaysia: Neither authoritarian nor democratic” in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison 
and Garry Rodan (eds.) Southeast Asia in the 1990s: authoritarianism, democracy and capitalism (St. 
Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993) p. 139. 
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DAP to find common ground.10 PAS’ determination to create an Islamic state was seen in 
the eyes of DAP leaders as being “incompatible with their dedication to principles of 
religious freedom and their demands for equality for all citizens.”11 In 1995, the Gagasan 
Rakyat disbanded as the DAP attempted to distance itself from Semangat 46 and PAS, 
citing that its association in the alliance “was being construed by its supporters as tacit 
support for PAS’ idea of an Islamic state.”12 Although the DAP was in no direct 
cooperation with PAS, its cooperation with Semangat 46, which was a member of both 
Gagasan Rakyat and APU, was sufficient justification for the DAP to break away from 
the opposition alliance on the grounds of ideological incompatibility. This demonstrates 
the volatility of association, the transient nature of opposition collaboration let alone the 
cooperation between the DAP and PAS. It must also be noted that the inability of 
Malaysian politics to move towards a two-coalition system in the early 1990s because the 
opposition parties lacked leadership as Semangat 46 was unable to lead Gagasan or APU 
after its poor performance in the 1990 general elections. A combination of both 
realpolitiks and ideological differences led to the failure of the experiment in opposition 
coalitions in the early 1990s. 
 
Thus, the establishment of the BA in 1999 with both the DAP and PAS as component 
members is a breakaway from conventional expectation of oppositional politics in 
Malaysia. Hence, it warrants the in depth study of events in the late 1990s that led to the 
formal cooperation between the DAP and PAS in the form of a coalition, and not merely 
                                                 
10
 C.f. Khong Kim Hoong, Malaysia's general election 1990: continuity, change and ethnic politics 
(Singapore: Insitute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991). 
11
 Gordon P. Means, “Malaysia in 1989” op. cit., p. 191. 
12
 Edward Terence Gomes, op. cit., p.238. 
 8 
an electoral alliance as that of either the APU or Gagasan Rakyat. The ability of the DAP 
and PAS to find commonality for cooperation despite their ideological orientations needs 




Literature Review, Framework and Methodology 
 
 Since William Riker’s influential work, The Theory of Political Coalitions13 was 
published in 1962, many theories on coalition politics have been developed within the 
Game Theory tradition. Early coalition theorists have attempted to explain political 
behaviour by borrowing concepts and theories from their counterparts in economics. 
Riker himself incorporated Von Neumann- Morgenstern’s The Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior14, a theory of n-person games which Riker identifies as “essentially a 
theory of coalitions.”15 In the 1960s, coalition theories continued to evolve and grow in 
numbers and by 1973, Abram de Swaan managed to identify 12 different coalition 
theories in his work, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations,16 and since then, new 
theories have emerged but many, if not all are variations and evolutions of early works on 
coalition theories.17 
                                                 
13
 William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). 
14
 John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgensten, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1944). 
15
 William Riker, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 
16
 Abram de Swaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A study of formal theories of coalition 
formation applied to nine European parliaments after 1918 (Amsterdam, New York: Elsevier Scientific 
Pub. Co., 1973). 
17
 See for example, James P. Kahan and Amnon Rapoport, Theories of Coalition Formation (Hillsdale, 
N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1984), Van Deemen, Coalition Formation and Social Choice (Boston: Kluwer 
 9 
 
In general, the literature on coalitions can be aggregated into two broad orientations. 
Namely, numerical based theories and policy based theories. Numerical based theories 
such as those advanced by Riker, and as their names suggest, are based solely on 
numerical criterions. These theories take into account the distribution of resources 
amongst individuals, the amount of resources needed to capture power and the 
redistribution of resources amongst winning coalitions. The other broad category is that 
of policy based theories that takes into consideration the ideological position of 
individuals and postulates that issues of policy ‘connectedness’ are crucial in the 
establishment of cooperation and coalition. In short, the core of any coalition is the 
similarities in outlook on policy matters and ideological orientations amongst coalition 
members. 
 
Riker’s Theory of Political Coalitions has been the foundation stone of contemporary 
numerical based theories on coalition formations that are anchored strongly in game 
theory. In his seminal work, Riker holds to two key assumptions which are core to the 
game theoretic traditions of coalition formation theories, the condition of rationality and 
the zero-sum condition. Riker developed his arguments based on the earlier work of Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern and though Riker was not the first to explore n-person games 
in economic situations, he was foremost in applying game theory to political situations. 
Fundamental to the game theory approach is the condition of rationality. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Academic Publishers, 1997), and Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm (eds.) Policy, Office or Votes? How 
political parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions (Cambridge, New York : Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
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“… I prefer a definition of rationality that does not use this imprecise notion (of power). I suggest 
the notion of winning. What the rational political man wants, I believe, is to win, a much more 
specific and specifiable motive than the desire for power. Furthermore, the desire to win 
differentiates some men from others. Unquestionably there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious 
men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are the irrational ones of politics. 
With these in mind, therefore, it is possible to define rationality in a meaningful way without the 
reference to the notion of power. Politically rational man is the man who would rather win than 
lose, regardless of the particular stakes.”18  
 
Riker defines rationality as ‘the notion of winning’ and that desire to win pushes the 
politically rational man to seek out the options available and chooses the path which he 
can best exploit to seek a win. The importance of establishing rationality is to enable the 
researcher to have an accountable and predictable set of behaviour when under similar 
conditions, facilitates cross comparative studies. In order to have a reusable model, there 
exists the need to establish a consistency in parameters and that parameter is the 
assumption of rationality that individuals seek to maximize gains or in Riker’s term, 
‘win’.  
 
The second assumption that Riker holds to is the zero-sum condition. “The zero-sum 
condition is the requirement that the gains of the winners exactly equal in absolute 
amount the losses of the losers.”19 Riker explains that; 
 
“In discussing bargains which are perceived as mutual gain, of course a non zero-sum model is 
best. On the other hand, in discussing election and wars, which are perceived as requiring 
indivisible victory, the zero-sum model is probably best.”20 
 
 
By adopting the zero-sum approach, a closed model coalition formation can be attained, 
there is no leakage, it is either in or out and there is no in-between. For example, as in the 
                                                 
18
 William Riker, op. cit., p. 22. 
19
 Ibid., p. 28. 
20
 Ibid., p. 31. 
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case of parliamentarian elections, the number of seats in parliament is finite, for every 
seat that is not won, then it is fair to consider it as lost. 
 
Riker forwards the position that coalitions building begins “when a leader, who is defined 
simply and circularly as a member who manages the growth of a coalition, undertakes to 
form one on a particular issue for decision.”21 Since the model operates in a zero-sum 
condition, and there is no single actor able to hold majority in a particular situation, “a 









 and where wi  is the weight of a member, i , 
can act for or impose its will on the body as a whole.”22 In simple terms, the coalition that 
is able to gather more than half of the overall sum of ‘weights’ of all actors in a body, is 
in a position to dictate its will and act independently as the representative of the decision 
making body.  
  
The condition of a zero-sum situation requires that the winnings of the victors must be 
equal to that of the losers. Since the spoils of victory must be shared amongst the victors, 
Riker argues that coalitions will then move towards what he calls, ‘minimal winning 
coalitions’. With perfect information, coalitions will tend towards the minimum size 
required to be in a winning position as a strategic maneuver in order to maximize the 
gains of each member from the redistribution of resources taken from the losers. Riker 
                                                 
21
 Ibid., p. 103. 
22
 Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
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encapsulates this as the size and strategic principles of political coalitions in n-person 
games.23  
 
Riker’s work on coalition formation deserves much attention as many contemporary 
works on coalition formation have evolved from his basic model derived in the 1960s. In 
recent years, there exist a trend of research attempts to include the notion of ‘power 
indices’ and ‘weighted voting’ to the elements of cooperative games including the 
formation of coalition. Manfred Holler and Guillermo Owen’s Power Indices and 
Coalition Formation provides a good overview of these recent developments.24  
 
Numerical-based theories lack the elements to predict which set of coalition will form 
from the pool of relevant actors. Each potential member of a coalition is evaluated on 
their set of resources or in a general term, their ‘weights’ in a competitive and/or 
cooperative environment. William Gamson, a contemporary of Riker, attempted to 
include the element of predicting preferences of partners in coalitions. Gamson forwards 
the proposition that; 
 
 “…there is little value consensus in a coalition and the stability of a coalition requires tacit 
neutrality of the coalition on matters which go beyond the immediate prerogatives…mutual goal 
antagonism lie in the future and the present alliance may make both better off…”25 
 
 
Gamson’s theory of coalition does bear similar concerns of the initial distribution of 
resources and payoffs for each set of coalitions. His non-utilitarian strategy of 
preferences is an attempt to predict the choices of partners. This non-utilitarian strategy is 
                                                 
23
 Ibid., p. 211. 
24
 Manfred J. Holler and Guillermo Owen, Power indices and Coalition Formation (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2001). 
25
 William A. Gamson, op. cit., pp. 374-375. 
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the rank ordering of choices independent of the potential partner’s control of resources. 
The factors influencing this non-utilitarian preference will vary depending on the 
situation, “in a political convention, we would expect the relative similarity of others’ 
ideology and beliefs to be the principal determinant.”26 He acknowledges that several 
different sets of coalitions with different levels of payoff may be formed and argues that 
actors “will pursue strategies in the highest payoff class but among the alternatives in the 
same class he will choose that one which maximizes his non-utilitarian strategy 
preference.”27 
 
Policy based theories assumes that coalitions are made by political parties that resonate in 
policy outlook. As De Swaan observed, “considerations of policy are foremost in the 
minds of the actors and that the parliamentary game is, in fact, about the determination of 
major government policy.”28 It is the understanding of the proponents of such theories 
that political parties are formed primarily for the contestation of public office in order to 
influence policy directions. Thus, it is to the interest of the individual parties to seek out 
potential collaborators who have similar policy outlooks. A well known theory that 
originates from the policy based tradition is Axelrod’s “minimal connected winning 
coalitions.”29  The notion of “connectedness” means that parties in a coalition are 
adjacent on ordinal policy scale and by “minimal”, coalitions should be small.30 The 
importance of policy based theories is that the convergence of interest minimizes the 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., p. 375. 
27
 Ibid., p.382. 
28
 Abram de Swaan, op. cit.,p. 88. 
29
 Ibid., pp. 287-288. 
30
 Mats Sjolin, Coalition politics and parliamentary power (Lund : Lund University Press ; [Bromley] : 
Chartwell-Bratt , 1993) p.15. 
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potential for conflicts of interest and also contributes as element of predictability in the 
choices of coalition members. However, Strom and Muller note that the “policy seeking 
party remains the least adequately developed model of competitive party behaviour.”31   
 
The main criticism of formal theories of coalition formation, both numerical and policy 
based theories is that it fails to take into account particularistic determinants that affect 
coalitional behavior. Pridham argues that;  
 
“…while formal theories have had the merit of focusing on certain obviously key component of 
coalition politics…it is evident that they fail to take into account of a range of variables or 
determinants of coalitional behaviour…”32 
 
 
This is not to say that formal coalition theories do not contribute to the understanding of 
coalition formations. The theories above, have isolated and explored the contributions of 
particular factors but failed to take into account local constraints that affect coalition 
formation and behavior. For a more meaningful understanding of coalitional politics, real 
world constraints such as ethnic compositions, local electoral rules and political 
configurations should be included as structural constraints when studying a particular 
political system. Formal theories serve as a baseline from which the study proceeds. 
When combined with the local structural constraints, this forms the framework of 
research. Combining numerical elements such as the quantification of combined 
resources in terms of electoral base, party size and infrastructure with the identification of 
common goals and policy overlaps, it is then possible to determine the viability and 
                                                 
31
 Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm, op. cit., p. 8. 
32
 G. Pridham, ‘An inductive Theoretical Framework for Coalitional Behaviour’ in G. Pridham (ed.) 
Coalitional Behaviour in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for Western Europe ( Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986) as cited by Laver and Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics 
of Coalition in Europe (Oxford [England] ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1990) pp. 195-196. 
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potentials of the coalition. The value of intertwining numerical based approaches to 
policy based approaches and factoring in local constraints and limitations is that a more 
holistic and comprehensive study of DAP’s involvement with the opposition coalition 
can be obtained. Sacrificing the parsimony of general modeling of political coalitions, the 
explanatory powers of the specific incident of coalition, the DAP and the BA is increased 
tremendously. 
 
The general overview of the Malaysian political landscape is that of a post colonial state 
politically divided along communal lines. Harold Crouch observes that Malaysia “has 
always been controlled by an unequal alliance between the elites of the Malay and non-
Malay (mainly Chinese) communities.”33 In exchange for accepting Malay political 
primacy, the minorities especially the Chinese gained economic concessions. Termed as 
the ‘historic bargain’ amongst Malaysian historians, this political arrangement between 
the representatives of the various ethnic groups, UMNO, MCA and MIC have kept to the 
principles of this bargain first established under the banner of the Alliance and then its 
successor the BN.34 This power sharing arrangement by the ruling BN has enabled them 
to enjoy continued dominance by winning all national elections and nearly all state 
elections since 1957. James Jesudason provides a good overall observation on the 
perpetuation of the BN. He states that the resilience of what he calls ‘one-party 
dominance’ in Malaysia is due to UMNO being “presented with an historic opportunity 
                                                 
33
 Harold Crouch, “Malaysia: Neither authoritarian nor democratic” op.cit., p. 136. 
34
 For a greater study into the ‘historic bargain’, see for example Cheah Boon Kheng’s Malaysia: The 
Making of a Nation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). 
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to consolidate its position” and “to build upon top-down structure of the colonial state to 
remain as long-lived dominant parties.”35 
 
On the issue of opposition parties, the ethnic factor in Malaysian politics has strongly 
affected the nature of the opposition political parties, and placed limitations on their bases 
of support. The main opposition parties in Malaysia, the DAP and the PAS “have usually 
foregone multi-communal support by directing their appeal almost exclusively to either 
Malays or non-Malays.”36 This is not to say that the BN component parties do not appeal 
specifically to their respective ethnic bases of support. For example, Hussin Mutalib has 
observed that UMNO has been in the “forefront of communal politicking, demonstrated 
in its oft-quoted defence of the slogan ‘Hidup Melayu’ (Long Live the Malays).”37  But as 
Crouch argues, the opposition though enjoying somewhat “solid if limited bases of 
support in both the Malay and non-Malay communities; but unlike the government 
parties, they have not been able to work out enduring cooperative arrangements amongst 
themselves.”38 Besides the communal divide, the ideological divide between PAS and 
DAP prevents the formation of a united opposition front prior to 1998. Edmund Gomez 
cites the issue of the ethnic factor in the creation of two loose coalitions, that of the APU 
and the Gagasan in the late 1980s and early 1990s.39 Khong Kim Hoong’s analysis of the 
1990 Malaysian general election concludes that the primary reason for the existence of 
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two separate oppositional electoral alliance lie in the inability of PAS and DAP to find 
common ground on policies due to their distinct ideological orientations.40 
 
Recent literature on Malaysian politics provides several different explanations for the 
formation of the BA. Hwang In-Won’s study of the Malaysian state under Mahathir 
suggests the possibility of Malaysian politics moving beyond ethnic interest and 
becoming less racial. Hwang observes that the coalition formed in 1999 was a more 
sophisticated alliance rather than a ‘marriage of convenience’ as that of the oppositional 
alliances in 1990.41 The BA was a “response to the new political atmosphere which 
produces a greater commitment to a more open, accountable, and democratic 
government.”42 On the other hand, John Hilley argues that the events in the late 1990s 
was a reaction towards ‘Mahathirism’ and an action of counter-hegemony that lead to the 
de facto alliances of the main opposition parties.43 Antipathy towards Mahathir as an 
individual and to UMNO and the BN as the government grew over the years. The 
handling of the then recent events such as the imprisonment of Lim Guan Eng, the 
financial crisis and the sacking and trial of Anwar brought this antipathy to a crescendo. 
This sentiment then manifested itself into outright protest and eventually the convergence 
of interests and the consolidation of cooperation between oppositional forces. 
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Khoo Boo Teik postulates that the roots of the political impasse in the late 1990s are a 
resultant of the end of UMNO’s hegemonic stability.44 Severe intra party factionalism not 
only weakened UMNO as a whole, but also affected the BN. Compounded with the 
financial crisis of 1997; the opposition capitalized on the situation and rose to challenge 
UMNO and the BN. In explaining the cooperation between the various opposition 
political parties, Khoo Boo Teik asserts that the situation in Malaysia was ready for the 
creation of an oppositional alliance. If not for the establishment of the BA, “Malaysian 
politics would have to invent some other form of a ‘second coalition’.”45 Khoo cites three 
fundamental reasons to substantiate his claim. Firstly, for pragmatic reasons, no single 
opposition entity is capable of effectively challenging either BN or UMNO single 
handedly. The second reason stems from the resentment of BN’s domination of the state, 
and the BA’s multi-ethnic, multi-religious and NGO supported coalition was “the only 
practical  chance of erecting a bulwark against the further erosion of constitutional 
government.”46 The third reason is what Khoo terms as the ‘cultural imperative of 
coalition building’. Malaysian politics has been coloured with various coalitions 
throughout history. As the political situation develops and contentious politics converge 
between oppositional groups to the dominant power, the experiences in history calls for 
the establishment of alliances and coalitions.47  
 
Oppositional political parties are a subset of the greater political opposition in Malaysia. 
It has been established that the DAP and PAS, as the main opposition political parties, 
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have several key differences that have limited the degree of association, let alone 
cooperation. Meredith Weiss examines the political situation in the late 1990s and places 
great importance on the role of civil society actors (CSA) who brought about the push for 
reforms, protest and the eventual formation of the BA. Weiss defines contentious politics 
along the lines of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, as it “involves the making of all sorts of 
claims” by both domestic and external actors who have particular interests and stakes in 
the outcome of political contentions.48 Contentious politics is contained when the various 
contenders are “established actors employing well established means of claim making” 
and it is transgressive when “at least some parties to the conflict are newly self identified 
political actors and/or …at least some parties employ innovative collective action.”49 It is 
at this juncture of containment and transgression that coalitional capital, as termed by 
Weiss, “a concept related to social capital, but at the organizational rather than the 
individual level” exists.50 As the interest of both established opposition political parties 
and that of the CSAs converged, a new and dynamic political space is created that allows 
for the association, discussion, negotiation and alliances of oppositional political forces. 
It is in this new space that CSAs play an important role in the building of trust amongst 
the ethnic based parties especially the DAP and PAS and in doing so, strives to create 
“noncommunal alternatives” to the political system.51 
 
Though the study focuses on coalitional theory, other political science concepts and 
theories on political parties, political cleavages and party systems will also be employed. 
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The research is primarily qualitative in nature as opposed to the predominantly 
quantitative approach of the theory reviewed. This is intentional as an attempt to provide 
a qualitative Asian case study to complement existing literature. The research 
methodology is a combination of secondary literature to illuminate the background of the 
study and primary sources such as newsprints, party publications (both print and internet) 
and interviews with party leaders. For quantitative measures, data of the general elections 
serve as indicators of the electorates’ mood and party performance whenever relevant. 
These data sets are obtained from a variety of sources including official results of the 
Elections Commission of various general elections and data compilations by third parties 






These recent studies on Malaysian political developments in the late 1990s have 
contributed significantly to the understanding of that tumultuous period. However, in 
their examination of the DAP-PAS cooperation and BA in general, they have studied this 
particular topic as part of the larger picture of political opposition. It is in this sense that 
this particular research does not replicate these contemporary studies, but seeks to 
complement them by focusing specifically on oppositional cooperation in Malaysia 
whereby the opposition have been traditionally divided along ethnic and religious lines. 
While Hwong In-Won and Hilley to a certain extent, focused on Mahathir’s personalized 
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style of political control and the subsequent challenges to this one-man institution, Khoo 
Boo Teik reexamined the fundamentals of Malaysian social construct amidst the 
turbulence of globalization, political ambitions of key leaders and the results of 
Malaysia’s experiment along the capitalist road. Meredith Weiss’ study of Malaysian 
civil society offers a plausible account for oppositional cooperation. Accepting that CSAs 
have played a role in political opposition, however, its inability to convince the DAP to 
continue with the BA in 2001 suggest that there exist certain areas in oppositional 
cooperation that requires further investigation. Has the ‘coalitional capital’ run out of 
reserves or has the entrenchment of traditional oppositional cleavages made opposition 
coalition building a fruitless venture?  
 
The argument that this study attempts to establish is this: the cooperation between DAP 
and PAS within the larger coalition of the BA is a strategic political maneuver. The 
Malaysian political landscape was ripe with resentment against the ruling coalition of the 
BN. While Anwar’s maltreatment and the boldness of his defiance stimulated the 
Reformasi movement, it was the underlying dissatisfactions against the BN government 
and Mahathir’s leadership that paved the way for the convergence of oppositional forces 
within Malaysia to challenge the incumbent regime. With the rising tide of Reformasi and 
the implosion of UMNO due to factionalism (Anwar’s removal) the BN government 
appeared to be at its weakest moment. Faced with such a situation, the DAP assisted by 
recent events that bolstered inter-ethnic ties such as the imprisonment of Lim Guan Eng 
while defending the rights of a Malay-Muslim girl, the support of Anwar for Lim Guan 
Eng’s case, took the plunge to cooperate with PAS in order to capitalize on the political 
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impasse. However, the cooperation was short lived not because of the DAP’s 
dissatisfaction with the 1999 election results, but its uneasiness over PAS’ continued 
push towards the creation of an “Islamic state” despite its promises to adhere to the joint 
BA manifesto of October 1999. Since the early 1980s, a revitalized PAS under the 
leadership of prominent ulamas such as Hadi Awang, Nik Aziz and Fadhil Nor have 
renewed the party’s call for the creation of an Islamic state in Malaysia. In brief, the 
ideological foundation of the Islamic state is rooted in the Qur’an and Sunnah, and its 
constitution is derived “from the ‘Covenant of Madinah’, which the Prophet Muhammad 
granted to the city upon his emigration there in the year 622.”52 While the Western 
secular conception of the state separates religion from the state constitution, the Islamic 
state is a “morally based State and politics and religion are inextricably interwoven.”53 As 
observed by Hussin Mutalib, at the ideological and theoretical level, “there are sufficient 
provisions in Islam guaranteeing … the rights, safety and security” of non-Muslims in an 
Islamic state.54 Hussin also notes that PAS has offered few convincing examples on the 
plausibility of an Islamic state in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Malaysia.55 This has 
aroused concerns and fears in the non-Muslim community in Malaysia over issues such 
as religious and personal freedom vis a vis  an Islamic state in Malaysia.56   
 
This ideological factor proved to be the stumbling block to long lasting cooperation. 
Despite the presence of KeADILan and PRM in the BA, these other political parties and 
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the DAP itself could not moderate the position of PAS over the issue of the Islamic state. 




This study begins with a discussion of the nature of Malaysia politics in Chapter 1. The 
chapter first looks at the origins of political cooperation amongst early elite led 
Malaysian political parties such as UMNO, MCA and MIC. These elite political 
negotiations and bargaining laid the foundations for the creation of a consociational 
democracy in Malaysia. The chapter moves on to discuss the origins, ideologies and 
appeal of the various component members of the opposition coalition, the BA. It argues 
that the opposition political parties each appeal to different political cleavages and thus, 
the consociational structure in place proves to be a challenge to the opposition. As an 
individual opposition party, none of the BA members are able to single handedly take on 
the BN as the issues of contention that are raised against the BN often appeals only to a 
certain communal cleavage. These challenges are easily absorbed by the BN through its 
long established mechanisms of political bargaining amongst its leading component 
parties that are representative of the ethnic divisions in Malaysia. 
 
Chapter 2 looks at the changing political environment that facilitated oppositional 
coalition building. The chapter identifies several key factors such as the imprisonment of 
Lim Guan Eng, the rise of civil society movements and the Anwar incident, which 
allowed oppositional forces to transcend above communal politics. This chapter ties in 
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the theoretical discussions to shed light on the DAP’s decision to participate in coalition 
building with its ideological rival the PAS, the small and uninfluential PRM and the 
newest political party in Malaysia, KeADILan. The BA’s structure, goal and election 
manifesto will be examined in close detail. The argument made here is that the DAP 
behaved rationally based on the developing situation in Malaysian politics, decided in 
1999 to capitalise on the moment of political uncertainty in order to advance itself in 
Malaysian politics. 
 
The Malaysian 1999 General Election yielded interesting results for both the BN and the 
BA. Chapter 3 examines the outcome of the 1999 general elections and looks at the 
implications of the election results on the new opposition coalition. A detailed 
examination of the election results will be compared to the results of previous general 
elections. This chapter will argue that though the elections results were not to the DAP’s 
expectation, it was not the fundamental cause for the eventual exit of the DAP from the 
BA. 
 
Chapter 4 offers an insight into the decision of the DAP to exit the BA. This chapter 
argues that the DAP and the PAS’ irreconcilable differences over the desire of the PAS to 
establish an Islamic state is the key factor that lead to the DAP pulling out from the BA in 
September 2001. Communal politics is very much alive and deeply entrenched in 
Malaysian politics and the desire for each party to retain their communal electorate 
worked against the opposition coalition. With reference to coalitional theory, the breakup 
of the coalition will be explained in terms of changing coalitional preferences and intra-
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coalitional contestation. The chapter will also argue that the events of September 11, 
2001, though impacting on the publicity of the PAS, was not a determinant in the DAP’s 
termination of its membership in the BA. 
 
The concluding chapter sums up the findings of the entire research and the implications 
of this study. It will reiterate the arguments of the research that cover both theoretical 
aspects of coalition building and coalitional termination of the DAP in the BA. This study 
contributes to the understanding of the political developments in Malaysia, especially on 
the oppositional political parties through the perspective of the DAP from the late 1990s 
to the early 2002. This qualitative case study of Malaysia is also a contribution to other 
studies on “coalitional theory” which has been predominantly quantitative and Euro-


























Origins, Ideologies and Appeal of Malaysian Opposition Parties 
 
 
True football fans do not merely support the team that is in the lead. True fans 
support the team which they can associate and identify with. These associations and 
identification may come about through territorial affiliations, personal affinities, family 
bonds and a whole host of other reasons. True fans will follow the team through thick and 
thin, sharing the joys of victory and the tears of defeat, ever vowing to return victorious 
in the next season. 
 
Similarly, political parties “require a base which is uncritically loyal, which will work 
and support them even when conditions go bad.”57 Political parties do not exist in 
vacuums. They are a product of societal configurations and divisions. Before this study 
proceeds further, it may be wise to discuss not only the origins and political cleavages to 
which the component parties of the BA belong, but also to look at the political system, 
the ‘field’, which the political parties operate in within Malaysia. 
 
This chapter will look at the communalization of Malaysian politics, resulting in the 
establishment of a consociational democracy in Malaysia. It will then look at the origins 
and orientations of the individual opposition parties, namely the DAP, PAS, KeAdilan 
and PRM.  
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The theory of ‘consociational democracy’ was pioneered by the political scientist, Arend 
Lijphart in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Lijphart’s original theory of consociational 
democracy focused on the political accommodations between elites of a plural society in 
the Netherlands.58 The main argument of this theory is that despite the existence of 
“structural constraints and mass tensions, elites have been able to maintain (or recover) 
their accommodations along ethnic lines, enabling them to operate a stable, even semi-
democratic regime.”59 These societal elites often, representing the interest of their ethnic 
communities, are able to negotiate, bargain and accommodate with each other to create 
and maintain a stable government with core democratic elements. Although competition 
amongst the elites from the same ethnic community for the right to represent the entire 
community does exist, in the interactions between elites of other ethnic groups, an 
accommodative approach is favoured. 
 
This elite centered approach, though developed from the observations of European 
democracies, has been applied to the study of Malaysian politics. Prominent Malaysian 
scholars such as R.S. Milne, Diane K. Mauzy, Gordon Means and William Case have 
adopted this particular theoretical framework in their research.60 The formation of 
UMNO in 1946 as a response towards the Malayan Union plan and the later formations 
of the MCA and MIC clearly demonstrate the origins of political participation in post war 
Malaya as a reaction towards issues of citizenship qualifications and rights. Each ethnic 
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community, in the desire to achieve their political goals, preferred to cooperate and 
negotiate with other ethnic communities at the elite level. Thus political parties were 
formed along communal lines. What first began as an electoral strategy of cooperation 
was consolidated in the multi-ethnic Alliance Party and later with the onset of 
independence, the essence of a consociational democracy was sealed in the form of the 
Malayan Constitution of 1957. Bargaining between the communal parties especially 
between UMNO and the MCA centered on the exchange of political power for economic 
access. In return for recognizing Malay political dominance, the preservations of Malay 
special positions and land privileges, the Chinese and to a little extent the Indians, were 
granted freedom to continue to pursue their economic interest.61 
 
The early political accommodations between the ethnic political parties appeared to have 
come to an end with the 13th May 1969 political riots. In explaining the causes of the 
riots, Cheah Boon Keng cites the most important factors as the “Malay dissatisfaction 
over ‘non-Malay’ threats and challenges to Malay rights and Malay political primacy.”62 
Over the first decade of independence, some segments of the Malay community have 
argued for the faster transition of Malaya into a Malay state. Frustration over the 
persistence of the Chinese language in daily activities, dissatisfaction over the National 
Language Bill and the slower than expected pace of the ‘Malaynisation’ of the state and 
the lack in economic progress and opportunities especially for the Malay youths escalated 
the existing ethnic tensions between the Malay and Chinese community. 
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Moreover, the MCA’s decision to exit the Alliance government after its dismal 
performance in the 1969 general elections was read as a betrayal of UMNO by the Malay 
community. What was meant as an action by MCA to ‘punish’ the Chinese electorate by 
denying them a mechanism and platform for bargaining with UMNO back fired and was 
interpreted negatively.63 However MCA chose to return to the side of UMNO after the 
1969 incident in the form of a new coalition. The Barisan National was officially 
registered with the Registrar of Societies in 1974. It is obvious that the ethnic elites 
understood the symbiotic relationship that they share with each other and realised that the 
foundations of retaining political power lay in a broad base political alliance amongst the 
leading ethnic groups. This power sharing arrangement between UMNO, MCA, MIC and 
several other minor political parties have ensured the continued return of the BN to power 
since 1974. This structure of accommodation between the representatives of the various 
ethnic groups has arguably prevented the outbreak of a second racial riot. To the credit of 
the BN, the intra-BN negotiations and bargaining has moderated ethnic chauvinism 
allowing for the development of a stable government and political system, which is akin 
to Lijphart’s theoretical model of a consociational democracy. It is this entrenchment of 
communal politics and the persistence of a consociational democracy in Malaysia that 
proves to be the biggest challenge to the opposition political parties. 
 
All political parties require a base of support for it to acquire resources, to recruit 
members and most importantly, a cause for it to represent. Lipset and Rokkan’s study of 
social structures and voting patterns contributed tremendously to the contemporary 
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understanding of political cleavages.64 Western European political parties have “emerged 
and stabilized around basic social cleavages.”65 In the case of Malaysia, the polities have 
emerged and stabilized around ethnic cleavages. Ethnicity is “at the same time both an 
imagined social construct and a deeply powerful and seemingly deeply ingrained social 
fact.”66 Political cleavages can only exist if individuals in society know their interest and 
are able to identify to which societal grouping that is representing their interest. Political 
cleavages become important, when sufficient individuals are not only able to identify and 
associate themselves to a particular cleavage, but also participate actively in the cleavage 
and in the simplest manner of participation, cast their votes for the representatives of the 
cleavage in national elections.  
 
Democratic Action Party of Malaysia 
In a system where ethnicity and communal politics are the bedrocks of society, the DAP 
appears to be a misplaced entity. The DAP has its roots in the People’s Action Party 
(PAP) of Singapore. After the merger of Singapore and Malaya to form the Federation of 
Malaysia in 1963, the PAP ventured into the peninsula to contest for elections. 
Propagating a democratic socialist approach, the PAP called for the establishment of 
meritocracy and used the rallying cry of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’, posing a challenge to the 
concept of a ‘Malay Malaysia’. Rather than accepting the political primacy of a particular 
ethnic race, the PAP advocated the equality of races which clearly irked the feelings of 
UMNO towards Lee and the PAP. Tension between Lee and the UMNO leaders 
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intensified and the overall uneasiness of the Malay community over the challenge to the 
framework of a Malay-based nation state led to the eventual separation of Singapore from 
the Federation in 1965. 
 
The Malaysian branch of the PAP reconsolidated itself and renamed itself as the 
Democratic Action Party inheriting the democratic socialist orientations of its 
predecessor, the PAP. The DAP was formally registered on 18th March 1966 with the 
Registrar of Societies. The late Devan Nair was the DAP’s first secretary-general and Dr 
Chen Man Hin was the party chairman.67  
 
Using Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond’s typology of political parties, the DAP can 
be identified as a mass-based pluralist political party with socialist orientations.68 The 
party is said to be theoretically mass-based as it attempts to be non-communal and 
advocating the equality of races through its ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ and later ‘Malaysian 
First’ campaign. However in the composition of its leadership, members and supporters, 
the DAP is viewed as a Chinese political party, hence working contrary to the intentions 
of the DAP to appear as a multi-ethnic political party. 
 
It is not to the intention of the DAP leadership to portray the party as a Chinese, and 
hence a communal party. In an interview between Goldman and Chong Eng, the current 
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deputy secretary-general of the DAP revealed the difficulties of the party in shedding its 
image as a Chinese-centered party. 
 
“It’s not that the DAP wants to attract the Chinese, it’s just that it’s the Chinese who are attracted 
to the DAP philosophy…if in opposition, people are dissatisfied. If Malay, then to PAS if 
religious or to PRM, if Chinese, can’t join MCA or Gerakan who endorses BN policies…” 69  
 
 
The DAP becomes the de facto focal point for the expression of Chinese political 
dissatisfaction with the status quo. The party leadership’s attempts to field non-Chinese 
candidates have been met with criticism from both within its membership and their 
political opponents. DAP’s Malay candidates have been rejected by DAP members as 
“poorly qualified and unrepresentative of the DAP’s core.”70 UMNO on the other hand 
paints the DAP Malay candidates as lacking in credibility amongst the Malay community 
and accuses them of being “reckless, self-interested puppets (of the Chinese DAP).”71 
Goldman has also cited sources within the DAP who claims that the non-Chinese are 
given nominal roles within the party for the sake of portraying a notion of multi-ethnicity 
in the party.72  
 
The DAP’s attempted to portray itself as a non-communal party has been challenged by 
both its own actions and to a certain extent, the ‘demonization’ of the party as a 
chauvinistic Chinese party by the BN. 
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Kua Kia Soong, a prominent Malaysian civil rights activist, offers an insight into the 
inner workings of the DAP in his book, Inside the DAP: 1990-1995.73 According to Kua, 
the DAP lacked clear socialist goals and objectives and is not capable of providing 
radical alternatives to BN policies. Moreover, the DAP’s infatuation with the retention of 
the Chinese electorate at the sake of cross communal cooperation with other opposition 
parties after the 1990 general elections was a turnoff to many civil rights activists who 
joined the DAP in the late 1980s. Furthermore, Kua notes that though the DAP professes 
to be a democratic socialist party, its party hierarchy is highly authoritarian with power 
residing in Lim Kit Siang, the DAP’s long serving secretary-general.  
 
In June 1998, three senior members of the DAP were suspended after accusations of 
nepotism were hurled at Lim Kit Siang.74 Amongst those suspended were the DAP vice 
chairman, Liew Ah Kim. Over the years, Lim has received criticism for his apparent 
attempt to groom his son, Lim Guan Eng to succeed him as the party secretary-general. 
Dissension within the party was especially strong in DAP’s northern bastion of Penang 
where state DAP leaders organized the “Kick Out Kit Siang” campaign.75 Intra-party 
factionalism continued into 1999 even as the party was preparing to challenge the BN 
over the slow economic recovery. In April 1999, 12 DAP members including the Penang 
Youth Chief, Teh Beng Hai were sacked in a major purge of the party.76 Days later, over 
500 DAP members in Pontian, Johor quit the party as a protest over the earlier dismissal 
                                                 
73
 Kua Kia Soong, Inside the DAP: 1990-1995 (Kuala Lumpur: Oriengroup, 1996). Dr Kua joined the DAP 
in 1990 and stood as its candidate for the Petaling Jaya parliamentary seat and won. His attempt to retain 
the seat in 1995 was dashed when he was disqualified on nomination day because of an omission in his 
candidacy papers.   
74
 Brendan Pereira, “Three Senior DAP Members Suspended”, Straits Times 6 June 1998. 
75
 “Penang Drive to Oust Kit Siang”, Straits Times 27 June 1998. 
76
 “DAP Sacks 12 in Major Purge” Straits Times 15 April 1999. 
 34 
and suspension of party stalwarts.77 As the opposition forces in Malaysia were gearing up 
to challenge the BN, the DAP had to put its house in order as intra-party conflict severely 
dented its organization and gave the party plenty of negative publicity. 
 
Parti Islam SeMalaysia 
PAS has its origins within the framework of UMNO. PAS was formed in 1951 under the 
leadership figures such as Haji Fuad Hassan, who was then the head of UMNO’s Bureau 
of Religious Affairs, and Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy. In the early days of UMNO, the 
leadership of the party rested on many well connected aristocratic elites. Their ability to 
rally the Malay masses from the rural areas was predominantly the effort of Malay 
teachers, who had the ability to reach out and aroused the concept of ‘Malay 
consciousnesses’. 78  The traditional structure of the Malay community allowed the 
UMNO elites unchallenged authority to construct the leadership and direction of UMNO. 
While the elites prospered, Malay masses remained in their relative conditions. As the 
void between UMNO elites and the masses grew, religious leadership surfaced as the 
alternative to UMNO leadership. As the party advance, the elites of the party who were 
anglophile and secular in nature were detached from the more pious Malay Muslims.79 
The emergence of PAS is a direct challenge to UMNO as the predominant Malay 
political party, as both claims the support from the same ethnic cleavage. Although PAS 
is ideologically rooted in a religious framework, the fact that all Malays are 
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constitutionally defined as practitioners of the Islamic faith places them in competition 
with UMNO for electoral support. 
 
The PAS is unable to spread its appeal beyond the Malay-Muslim cleavage. The non-
Malays especially the Chinese community is apprehensive towards the PAS intention to 
set up an Islamic state. After winning over the state government of Kelantan from the BN 
in 1990, PAS ventured into its experiment to establish an Islamic government by 
announcing its intention to introduce Islamic law known as hudud law.80 This caused 
great concern not only amongst the non-Malay population of Kelantan, but throughout 
Malaysia. Though PAS was unable to introduce hudud law, its administration over 
Kelantan impacted severely on social practices of the state’s residents.81 Rules ranging 
from decency of attire according to Islamic standards, the introduction of separate queues 
in shopping lanes for the different sexes to bans on both contemporary popular culture as 
well as traditional performance such as the ‘Mak Yong’ were enforced.82 
 
Parti Rakyat Malaysia 
The PRM was originally founded as Parti Rakyat in 1955. The party later changed its 
name into Parti Socialist Rakyat Malaysia before dropping its socialist label to become 
the PRM. A small Malay-based party led by left leaning intellectuals, the PRM acts in the 
fringes of Malaysian politics. PRM has only managed to attract the limited support from 
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the lower and middle class young Malays.83 In fact, its socialist orientations have earned 
it criticism from the majority of the Malay community that views socialism as un-Islamic 
and anti-Malay. In 1990, Syed Husin Ali and Sanusi Osman were elected president and 
secretary-general respectively. Upon their appointment to the helm of the PRM, Syed 
Husin and Sanusi Osman were required to resign from their academic positions at state 
universities.84 As a small political party, the PRM does not have as large a base of 
support as either the DAP or PAS. In the midst of the DAP internal struggles in April 
1999, the PRM was in a row with DAP for absorbing recently resigned members of the 
DAP into its ranks.85 
 
Parti KeADILan Nasional 
KeADILan is the most recently formed political party amongst the component members 
of the BA. Having its roots from the social movement ADIL, the party claims to be open 
to all Malaysian regardless of ethnicity. Attempts to register ADIL with the Registrar of 
Societies were in vain. However, the movement’s leaders managed to circumvent the 
government’s decision by assuming the credentials of a dormant political party.86 
KeADILan was formally launched on the 4th of April 1999. Led by Wan Azizah, the wife 
of Anwar Ibrahim, KeADILan attracted intellectuals, civil society activists and a whole 
host of pro-Reformasi individuals and organizations. Riding on the tide of Reformasi, the 
party focused its call for social justice and continued its cooperation with both the 
existing opposition political parties and civil society movements. As a political party, 
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KeADILan lacked the money and machinery to function as a proper organization but 
what it had was the sympathy and support from Anwar backers, pro-reformasi activist 
and intellectuals. While having no distinct association to any existing political cleavage 
in Malaysia, the rise of KeADILan did suggest the creation of a new political cleavage in 
Malaysia. Francis Lok Kok Wah postulates the possibility of the creation of a new 
political “discourse and the practice of participatory democracy has gained 
ground…particularly among Malays.”87 With the birth of KeADILan, there were hopes 
and expectations from many that Malaysian politics had moved to a new paradigm and 




The DAP, PAS and the PRM have existed for decades within the Malaysian political 
system. As individual parties, each of the political parties has only limited appeal to 
particular segments in society. As individual parties, they are unable to take on the grand 
coalition of the BN single handedly. What ever challenge that they may hurl at the BN 
would only be an attack on a single front which is easily absorbed and counter-attacked 
by the BN. DAP in its representation of Chinese issues is often portrayed as the 
chauvinistic Chinese party to the Malay electorate while the BN would play on the fear of 
non-Malay religious freedom to garner support against PAS. KeADILan as an untested 
political party does not have a traditional base of support, though appearing to have the 
support of the Reformasi movement and disgruntled members of UMNO. 
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Prior to 1998, cooperation between the political opposition especially the opposition 
political parties were certainly unpredictable. The most recent oppositional alliance, that 
of the APU and Gagasan Rakyat ended with mix results. Though PAS through APU 
managed to win Kelantan, the APU is now defunct as members of S46 returned to the 
arms of UMNO. What the oppositional alliance highlighted was the ideological 
incompatibility of Malaysia’s two main opposition political parties and in late 1990s, the 
ideological differences between PAS and DAP would once again become the most 





























The Making of the Opposition Coalition 
 
 
The coming together of the main opposition political parties to challenge the BN 
is not something that many would have foreseen prior to 1997. The disjointed political 
parties, separated by their ideologies, appeals and bases of support were not likely to be 
able to form a cohesive team capable of challenging the BN but this is what precisely the 
BA managed to do in 1999. This chapter attempts to explain the changing conditions that 
facilitated collaboration between the opposition forces in Malaysia. It will first provide a 
general account of the factors that contributed to the overall increase in opposition 
cooperation before venturing into the specific factors that contributed to coalition 
building. The initial cooperation soon expanded as the Reformasi movement grew in 
strength and finally upon the expectations of a coming general election, the various 
oppositional forces consolidated their efforts to challenge the BN into the formation of a 
broad based political coalition. While there may be commonalities in objectives against 
the BN, what is of interest is the ability of the DAP to put aside its concerns over a formal 
cooperation with the PAS. This chapter will explain the decision of the DAP to engage 
not only the PAS but also the PRM and KeADILan as a strategic maneuver and 
consistent with the expectations of the various coalitional theories. 
 
The general rise of opposition cooperation can be explained by three chief reasons. 
Firstly, political developments of Malaysia over the last decade had seen a rise in the 
concentration of power in the executive, namely in the hands of Mahathir. Since the early 
1990s, “the Mahathir-led ruling elite has shown greater tolerance in ethnic politics while 
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at the same time, further restricted ‘limited democracy’ through hegemonic state 
control.”88 The undermining of judicial independence, made public by controversial cases 
such as that of Lim Guan Eng and Anwar, both of which will be discussed later in the 
chapter, and the increase in corruption, nepotism and money politics “provided more 
common ground for the opposition party.”89 In an interview with TalkAsia, later 
published by the Channel News Network (CNN), after his release in 2004, Anwar 
commented: 
 
“…Mahathir in the 80's and early 90's didn't have a problem with children being actively involved 
in business. By the 90's they were involved in practically every major industries in the country-by 
'96-97 they were in great difficulty. And he wanted to salvage and bail out one of the children. I 
was not unsympathetic to the son's particular predicament. But I did caution that you cannot use 
public funds because I have as a matter of procedure calls to table it to parliament. I can't go and 
use public funds.”90 
 
 
Southeast Asian economies including the Malaysian economy were badly affected by the 
so called “domino effect of the economic downturn that first began with the devaluation 
of the Thai baht in 1997”.91 The exchange rate of the Malaysian ringgit, from a high of 
RM2.493 to US$1 in April 1997, fell to RM2.636 in July 1997 and by January 1998; the 
exchange rate had fallen further to RM4.545 to US$1.92 In the period between 1996 and 
1997, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange’s market capitalization declined by over 50% 
from RM806.77 billion to RM375.80 billion. Accusations of nepotism and cronyism by 
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Mahathir and the UMNO elites were rife in the late 1990s as the impact of the financial 
crisis began to intensify. 
 
The second reason for the rise of opposition cooperation is the rise of civil society. As 
argued by Meredith Weiss, civil society actors (CSAs) played the role as facilitator of 
communications between the opposition political parties and the voters. By educating the 
political parties on the expectations of a democracy and illuminating the shortcomings of 
the current administration, CSAs functioned as the propagators of trust and 
accommodation between the ethnic parties.93 By campaigning for a broad set of social 
grievances, CSAs activities were largely acceptable to opposition political parties and in 
the mobilization of society at large, CSAs “widened the debate and fostered social 
networks for the opposition to build on.”94 Brown cites the changing nature of the civil 
society movement by taking the example of the activism of Aliran, Malaysia's oldest 
human rights group, in 1999 as opposed to its impartiality in the mid 1980s. In a society 
pluralized by ethnic divides, civil society does offer a discourse that goes beyond ethnic 
politics. Though the activities of newly emerged non-ethnic civil societies, a relatively 
recent phenomenon in Malaysia, are confined to urban areas, they are able to reach out to 
the leadership of the opposition parties, who are based in the city areas. 
 
The third reason that can account for oppositional collaboration comes from the grievous 
fracture of UMNO itself. The current internal strife led to the ouster of Anwar from 
UMNO’s Supreme Council. Interpreted by opposition forces as a moment of weakness of 
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the current regime, the opposition increased their attack on the regime. With Anwar’s 
ouster and the forming of KeADILan, what was occurring in the late 1990s was similar to 
that of the late 1980s, the exit of a high ranking UMNO leader and the formation of a 
new political party that incorporated the disgruntled ex-members of UMNO. Though 
KeADILan poised itself as a multi-ethnic party open to all, it in fact had an agenda to 
recruit ‘disillusioned’ members of UMNO and portrayed itself as a party working 
towards Malay unity. In a KeADILan party pamphlet that was distributed as an 
introduction of the party, the intentions of the party leadership to absorb as many UMNO 
members as it could and its direct appeal to the Malay political cleavage was certainly 
evident. 
 
“… Keadilan would become the channel for thousands of ordinary Umno members and hundreds 
of thousands of Malaysians who are not members of any political party…Keadilan is hopeful that 
it can help them unite and establish an intra- party movement fighting for justice and 
reformasi…By persuading Umno members to return to their original struggle, Keadilan is paving 
the way for the unity of the Malays and indeed all Malaysians, based on high values and moral 
standards… Keadilan takes into consideration Malaysia's history. It realises that Malaysia's multi-
ethnicity which has developed now is the result of Malay unity ... the essence of Keadilan is 
Melayu and Malay leadership."95  
 
 
While attempting to project itself as a multi-ethnic political party, KeADILan was 
obviously aware that its vote bank laid in the traditional Malay-Muslim cleavage. With 
these developments as a result of the contestation of power within UMNO, the political 
opposition gained a new opposition champion, a new Malay led and supported political 
party and most importantly, a window of opportunity for an energized oppositional force 
to cooperate and intensify their challenge against the weakened UMNO and the 
incumbent BN regime. 
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The above factors explain the pronounced increase in cooperation between the various 
oppositional forces in the late 1990s. However, these explanations are insufficient to 
explain the next step of cooperation, namely the formation of a structured political 
alliance. As discussed in earlier chapters, the greatest challenge in coalition building 
amongst the disparate opposition political parties would be the ideological gulf between 
the DAP and the PAS. 
 
The Lim Guan Eng Case 
Arguably, several decisive events in the late 1990s pertaining directly to the DAP 
certainly facilitated the bridging of this great divide. Chief amongst these factors is the 
imprisonment of Lim Guan Eng in 1998 for sedition when he published a pamphlet 
entitled Ceramah Kisah Benar (The True Story) in 1995.96 The pamphlet contained 
information regarding the sex scandal of a former Chief Minister of Malacca involving an 
underaged school girl. Chief Minister Rahim Thamby Chik allegedly had a sexual 
relation with a young Malay girl, who also had sex with several other men. Though the 
other men were charged with statutory rape, Rahim Thamby Chik was not prosecuted as 
the then Attorney General, Datuk Abdullah Mokhtar felt there was insufficient evidence 
and doubted the credibility of the girl’s statements.97 The incident drew huge public 
outcry over the conduct of the Attorney General for making public the minor’s sexual 
history.98 The handling of the entire case and the involvement of Rahim Thamby Chik, a 
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senior UMNO member and the head of its youth wing, discredited both the judiciary and 
the BN government. 
 
Lim Guan Eng’s involvement in the issue had several implications for the DAP. Firstly, 
by actively lobbying against judicial inactions and representing the interest of the Malay 
girl on behalf of her grandmother, Madam Pendek Ahmad, Lim Guan Eng gained 
positive publicity for the DAP amongst the public, especially from the Malay community 
in Kota Melaka. Secondly, upon his conviction of sedition in 1998, he became a ‘martyr’ 
and a unifying symbol for the opposition against the failings and corruption of the BN. 
When Lim Guan Eng was released for good conduct after serving a year in prison, he was 
greeted by approximately 3000 supporters of various ethnicities at the Kajang Prison. 
Supporters from DAP, PAS, KeADILan, PRM and a whole host of others were present to 
garland him with flowers while chanting “Guan Eng is back” and “Down with 
Mahathir”.99 PAS Youth chief, Mahfuz Omar commented that “He (Lim Guan Eng) has 
fought for justice without concern about race. He fought for a Malay girl.”100 Such 
statements coming from a long time rival is certainly an indicator of the warming of 
relations between DAP and PAS.  
 
After Anwar’s removal from office, the ‘poster boy’ of the Reformasi movement showed 
his solidarity with Lim Guan Eng in several open public events and in published personal 
correspondence between himself and Guan Eng.101 This too improved the image of the 
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DAP amongst the Malay community. The politicization of the fact that Lim was a 
Chinese fighting for justice in a Malay case enabled the oppositional forces to rise above 
communal politics and find common ground. An account of Guan Eng’s experiences, 
chronology of events and various media coverage of the episode is documented in a party 
publication, Lim Guan Eng: MP in Jail, Malaysian Dream From Kajang Prison.102 
 
Rise of the Reformasi Movement 
Anwar’s sacking from political office and his eventual treatment by the authorities is 
arguably the catalyst for large scale protest against the BN regime. The incident provoked 
the outburst of public disgust especially in the middle urban class and resulted in the birth 
of many new civil society movements such as ADIL and the awakening of existing civil 
society movements into action. The significance of the Reformasi movement to the DAP 
was that the movement’s key agendas in addressing issues of human rights, social justice 
and good governance was in line with the DAP’s long standing party objectives. Though 
the initial factor that spurred civil society into action was the Anwar saga, the movement 
grew as it began to aggregate issues and expounded on authoritative tendencies of the 
government and eventually objectifying its goal in terms of social and political reforms. 
As Meredith Weiss observed; 
 
 “…the reformasi movement united a disparate array of organizations from both civil society and 
political society. Among the groups involved were political parties, advocacy-oriented non-
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By September 1998, two broad based coalitions of CSAs and political parties were 
formed to push for the reformist agenda. The Gagasan Demokrasi Rakyat (Coalition for 
People’s Democracy) or Gagasan for short, comprised of fourteen NGOs and also the 
main opposition parties, DAP, PAS and PRM.104 This NGO led platform provided a 
forum for discussion and the creation of alternative programmes to contest against 
prevailing BN policies. Having a very strong civil society flavour, Gagasan looked 
towards long term objectives through social reforms. On the same day as the formation of 
Gagasan, PAS formed the Majlis Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat Malaysia (Council of 
Malaysian People’s Justice Movement) Gerak. PAS took the opportunity in the midst of 
the Anwar’s arrest and detention to rally CSAs, political parties and NGOs to fight 
against Malaysia’s controversial Internal Security Act. Gerak though having a similar 
composition of members as Gagasan, had a stronger political orientation as it was led by 
PAS and attracted Islamic groups such as the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM). 
While Gagasan was active in the urban areas, Gerak’s activities had a more distinct 
Malay-Muslim orientation and were concentrated in rural Malay areas.105 
 
These two coalitions did not have formal links with Anwar. While ADIL was formed 
predominantly to champion Anwar’s case, Gerak and Gagasan though sympathizing with 
Anwar were committed to long term goals. What is of importance is the fact that the DAP 
and the PAS were both willing to be members in Gerak and Gagasan whereby the other 
was a member as well. Looking back at the early 1990s, the indirect association was 
sufficient to split the opposition camp into two loose alliances, one consisting of PAS and 
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the other of the DAP. It was clear that the situation in Malaysia was undergoing a 
transformation that was apparently assisting in the bridging of differences between the 
PAS and DAP. Gerak and Gagasan may be loose coalitions requiring minimal 
commitment from members, but provided the platform for engagement that laid the 
foundations of future cooperation. Repeated interactions allowed for the formation of 
social networks between DAP leaders and leaders from the other oppositional groups. 
The experiences in Gerak and Gagasan were important in the later establishment of the 
BA. 
 
The intensity of the general resentment could be felt in the various protests that took 
place in Malaysia between 1998 and 1999. In a particular incident in September 1998, the 
usual Friday prayers at the country’s national mosque in Kuala Lumpur was disrupted as 
the prayer session turned into a rally for Anwar. Up to 10,000 pro-Anwar supporters had 
to be dispersed by riot police.106 The series of street protests was uncommon in Malaysia. 
The protesters hailed from many segments of society including women’s groups.107 
Though the bulk of street protesters were pro-Anwar Malay youths, Chinese and Indian 
youths too joined the protest. However, not all that took to the streets were rallying for 
Anwar’s cause. As cited in the Washington Post; 
“ The diverse makeup of the crowd included Malay Muslims - Anwar's core base of support - and 
young ethnic Chinese Malaysians, a minority community that is less politically active. ‘We're not 
all for Anwar,’ said a young ethnic Chinese woman who came to the rally with her boyfriend. 
‘We're just against Mahathir’.” 108 
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The rise of a new discourse centering on social justice, human rights and good 
governance appeared to overshadow communal politics. Although Anwar’s cause took 
centre stage, many took the opportunity to voice their dissent towards Mahathir’s 
governance. In the wake of the general resentment towards the BN regime, the local 
Malaysian media received severe criticism for their apparent biased reporting. Hilley 
provides an excellent comparison between local media and international media on their 
coverage of the ongoing events in Malaysia.109 “Many Malaysians now abandoning the 
mainstream press altogether in search for alternative news sources”, giving rise to the 
increase in circulation of existing alternative media such as political party publications 
and internet websites.110 Amongst these alternative media that came to prominence was 
the PAS’ Harakah. Established as a party newsletter, Harakah was only to be sold to 
PAS party members. However, the publishing permits were easily flouted and copies 
were attainable from various vendors. Harakah’s circulation from the onset of the Anwar 
crisis grew from an average of 60,000 to around 300,000.111 
 
What is of interest is that Harakah was not only the mouth piece of PAS, but it 
capitalized on the demand for alternative media by increasing its distribution and also 
started its internet edition and even expanded its English section. Harakah was well 
received by many disenchanted Malaysians. Articles and commentaries by other 
opposition groups including the DAP were appearing in the Harakah. By including non-
PAS views, Harakah was proving an important platform for ‘cross-political exchange’.112 
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This certainly benefited the opposition movement on the whole as it allowed for open 
discussion on the state of Malaysia from diverse point of views. For the DAP, it is again 
another indicator of normalization of ties with the PAS. In general, cross communal 
interaction was on the increase in Malaysia. As observed by Sabri Zain, a well known 
Reformasi activist, there was a clear indicator of the changing times in Malaysia. In a 
political forum organized by the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall Civil Rights committee 
the entire table of panelist were Malays. In another incident, the Justice Forum organized 
by the DAP in Penang was attended by over 5000 people of whom at least 40% of the 
crowd were Malays. Yet another surprise came about at a PAS gathering in Kuala 
Lumpur when the gathered crowds cheered and welcomed long time opposition Chinese 
leader, Lim Kit Siang.113  
 
The DAP’s calculations 
It is evident that the mood of cooperation between the various opposition groups stems 
from the long term dissatisfaction with the incumbent government. While each segment 
of the political opposition had their own particular grievances, what united the opposition 
camp was their common interest to check on the powers of BN. Anwar’s sacking was the 
catalyst that brought into the open popular resentment and provided the impetus for 
oppositional collaboration. In the case of DAP, Guan Eng’s conviction and the Reformasi 
movement provided the precise opportunity for the DAP to revitalize itself. 
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Torn by internal factionalism leading to purges within both the party leadership and party 
ranks, the vast publicity generated by the controversy of Guan Eng’s conviction and later 
its solidarity with Anwar and the Reformasi movement allowed the DAP to cast aside the 
negative publicity and gave the party a cause to invigorate itself. The issues and discourse 
that were raised throughout early 1998 to 1999 was easily identifiable to the DAP. 
Common issues of social justice, human rights, democracy and the call to reform the 
government were issues championed by the DAP throughout its years in opposition. 
Moreover, with the apparent changing nature of Malaysian politics and the mass political 
participation, those observing the situation in the late 1990s would find the issue of cross-
communal cooperation to challenge the incumbent regime as a distinct possibility. The 
main opposition political parties, the DAP and the PAS appeared to be able to find 
common grounds and are for a fact, openly supporting the activities of the other. The 
experiences of cooperation in Gerak and Gagasan laid the foundations of future 
cooperation as the CSAs assisted activities expanded the social network of DAP and PAS 
members. Such simple interactions when repeated many times and strengthened by the 
desire to oppose a common enemy enabled both the DAP and PAS to put aside their long 
term differences to focus on the short term benefits of collaboration.   
 
In an interview with this present writer in 2006, Lim Kit Siang revealed the DAP’s 
reading of the situation in the late 1990s.114 According to Lim, the Anwar incident 
created in particular amongst the Malay community a new political mood. Previously, the 
Malay community has largely been uninvolved in the forces of change but they now 
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provided the thrust and impetus demanding for reforms. The restlessness of the Malay 
community, in particular the younger generation of Malays disappointed with Mahathir’s 
governance created a new political input into the situation.  
 
Lim recognizes that events, from the establishment of broad based coalitions such as 
Gerak and Gagasan to the case of Lim Guan Eng’s imprisonment for sedition led to a 
situation of greater cooperation transcending party lines, race, and language and extended 
to the next level of the creation of a grand coalition of opposition against the BN. Lim 
states that no individual nor organization deserves the credit for being the first to moot 
for a political coalition but the general atmosphere guided the forces of opposition to 
establish an opposition grand coalition. The DAP was always in favour of strengthening 
the opposition grouping but always had problems over the position of PAS. However in 
1999, for the first time because of the dynamics of the political situation in Malaysia the 
DAP ventured into the path of coalition building on the conditions that there must be 
clear ground rules. The DAP would engage with other oppositional forces to form a 
united coalition for strengthening the opposition grouping and in pushing for the cause of 
greater transparency and accountability in governance, for the improvement of human 
rights, which eventually became the core principles of the BA. Lim felt that there was the 
opportunity for the first time for a multi-ethnic grouping to emerge which can provide a 
stronger check to BN hegemony. Lim mentions that if the DAP does not take on a 
proactive role in the mobilization of the oppositional forces, then the DAP would be 
failing on their part to create a more balanced plural political system. 
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The DAP felt that the newly emerged forces of Anwar and KeADILan had to be shored 
up against the more established PAS. Lim revealed in the same interview with the present 
writer, that there were tensions within the opposition camp as he perceived the PAS of 
using bully tactics against the infant political party. Although the PAS wanted to make 
use of KeADILan, and in Lim’s words, “they (PAS) had no respect and had utter 
contempt for KeADILan” as they viewed the members of KeADILan having been former 
members of UMNO or UMNO sympathizers, would return to the side of UMNO and the 
BN once it was convenient and conducive to do so. This is a clear caution inherited from 
PAS’ failed coalition with S46 in APU. DAP realized that the political system in 
Malaysia demanded that political leadership should reside in Malay hands. Thus, in the 
desire to create a viable opposition, the opposition must also be Malay led. The DAP is 
unable to lead the coalition and clearly had no desire to see PAS taking the lead fearful 
that the issue of an Islamic state would occupy the agenda of the opposition coalition. 
DAP viewed Anwar and KeADILan as viable candidates to lead the opposition grouping 
but were unable to do so due to their infancy as a political party. DAP strategy within the 
opposition grouping was to buttress the young party and hoped that a prolonged 
opposition cooperation may be sustained and the KeADILan may come to maturity and 
lead the opposition forces not in the coming general election but the next. Hence, the 
DAP were willing to extend the level of cooperation from the various loose alliances with 
political parties and CSAs and took the next step of transforming the cooperation to a 
structured opposition coalition for electoral contestation. By doing so, the DAP viewed 
that it was able to fulfill their long term commitment to Malaysian society and at the 
same time checking on the expansion of PAS by supporting the development of 
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KeADILan, which lacked the political machinery and resources as compared to the 
established political parties. 
 
Weighing out the Parties 
Recalling Riker’s and other numerical based theories, the desire for coalition comes 
about when there is no dominant actor able to single handedly control the situation. 
Arising from such a situation, Riker predicts that a coalition consisting of the minimal 
number of actors needed to form the majority would come into existence. This 
assumption leads us to evaluate the validity of the BA as a serious contender in the 
elections and directly leads us to inquire on the purpose and electoral objectives of the 
opposition coalition. 
 
By middle of 1999, it would be difficult to gauge the degree of political hegemony of 
UMNO and the BN. Indicators at all political levels ranging from UMNO’s internal 
dissension within the Malay cleavage, the street protests and the rise of civil society 
suggest a new political consciousness was in play. Moreover, this new political 
consciousness had tangible organs of representation such as Gerak, Gagasan and ADIL. 
In the general elections from 1978 to 1995, PAS had been obtaining an average of 11.5% 
of the popular votes for parliamentary seats while the DAP obtained an average of 17.3% 
of popular votes for parliamentary seats (Table 1). Although the performances of both 
parties have been in the decline since their peak in the mid 1980s, the combined average 
of popular votes obtained by these two parties for parliamentary seats is approximately 
28.8%. Based on the averages of popular votes over the years and the current changes in 
 54 
the Malaysian political scene, it would not be outrageous to expect the DAP and the PAS 
to perform better than previous years. If the other opposition parties, KeADILan and 
PRM were to be included, then there would be a possibility of the opposition political 
parties gathering more than 30% of the popular votes for parliamentary seats. 
Table 1: Votes cast for the DAP and PAS in 5 General Elections 
 
Year of Election 1978 1982 1986 1990 1995 
  
Total votes cast 3596732 4296312 4752006 5778876 6255061   
PAS 537720 602530 716952 375896 438109   
DAP 664433 815473 975544 985228 723366   
Combined votes 1202153 1418003 1692496 1361124 1161475   
              
Percentage of votes 
          
Average 
PAS  14.95 14.02 15.08 6.50 7.00 11.51 
DAP  18.47 18.98 20.53 17.05 11.56 17.31 
              
Combined 33.42 33.00 35.61 23.55 18.56 28.83 
 
Source: Hj. Shaari bin Abdullah (chief editor), Almanak keputusan pilihan raya umum: Parlimen & Dewan 
Undangan Negeri, 1959-1999 trans. Almanac of General Election Results: Parliament & State Legislative 
Assembly, 1959-1999 (Shah Alam, Selangor: Anzagain, 2004). 
 
The DAP has made clear its intention of denying BN of its two-thirds parliamentary 
majority.115 The two-third benchmark allows for changes in the Malaysian Constitution. 
It is clear that the DAP realizes the limitation of the opposition camp and does not expect 
winning an outright majority of popular votes. However, it must be noted that the ‘first 
pass the post’ electoral system in place in Malaysia does not guarantee proportionality in 
terms of percentage of votes and actual number of seats controlled in parliament. From 
1978 to 1995, though obtaining an average of 11.5% of the popular votes, the PAS only 
managed to capture between 1 to 7 seats in parliament (Table 2). The DAP performed 
slightly better, by obtaining at its peak 24 parliamentary seats but when compared to the 
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total parliamentary seats, it is a mere 13.6% of the total seats though obtaining 20.53% of 
the popular votes in 1986. 
 
However, if the intention of the opposition is to deny the significant two-third majority, 
then the opposition coalition can be taken as a ‘blocking coalition’.116 By accepting this 
objective, the strength of the opposition based on past electoral results and the political 
mood in 1999, it would be plausible for the opposition to emerge as a blocking coalition. 
A blocking coalition though unable to push for the passing of bills, is nonetheless able to 
deny the party in power, in this case, the BN from changing the constitution. As revealed 
by Lim Kit Siang, the BN is a grand coalition and by denying them the two-third 
majority, the DAP hopes that the BN may unravel itself from within when political 
parties at the fringe of the BN move out into opposition.117    
 
Table 2: Distribution of Parliamentary seats for general elections from 1978 to 1995 
 
Year of Election 1978 1982 1986 1990 1995 
 
BN 130 132 148 127 162  
PAS 5 5 1 7 7  
DAP 16 9 24 20 9  
Others 3 8 4 26 14  
Total 154 154 177 180 192  
 
Source: Hj. Shaari bin Abdullah (chief editor), Almanak keputusan pilihan raya umum: Parlimen & Dewan 
Undangan Negeri, 1959-1999 trans. Almanac of General Election Results: Parliament & State Legislative 
Assembly, 1959-1999 (Shah Alam, Selangor : Anzagain, 2004). 
 
 
The BA Common Manifesto 
Although the various opposition political parties may have their own particular sets of 
interest and political objectives, they share a common interest to check on the powers of 
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the BN. It is possible to aggregate the diverse issues ranging from the over concentration 
of powers in the executive, authoritative tendencies of the state and basic transparency 
and accountability in governance into a common direction which is acceptable by the 
opposition forces. The BA common manifesto launched in October 1999 is a suitable 
representation of the convergence of interest of the disparate opposition parties.118 
Chandra Muzaffar acting as the spokesperson at the unveiling of the manifesto stated, 
“…the manifesto represents the consensus of all four parties. It does not include items not part of 
the consensus… We are committed to what is in the manifesto and nothing beyond that… to 
respect the ideological commitment of the various (opposition) parties.”119 
The manifesto as a document by itself sheds critical light on two important components 
in the formation of a coalition. Firstly, taking a lead from policy based theorists; a 
coalition may be united by their policy positions. Actors who are adjacent in policy 
positions are more likely to come together than those who are further apart. In the case of 
the Malaysian opposition, the various parties have been presented as having differing 
ideologies, political cleavages and historical baggage that would unlikely place them on 
similar positions over policies in general. However, substituting policy orientations with 
short term objectives, it is possible to interpret the focal points of common interests as 
‘policy positions’ that bind the political parties. In the case of Malaysia, the strong desire 
by the opposition forces to challenge the BN can be viewed as a definitive point of 
convergence. Since the goal of any political organization is to influence policy, the 
opposition party can increase their influence over policies in general by efforts of 
collusion within the opposition camp in parliament. As stated earlier, if the opposition is 
able to control at least 65 parliamentary seats out of 193 in the 1999 general elections and 
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decide to cooperate together, they are likely to form a blocking coalition in parliament. 
By blocking the passing of bills and constitutional changes, the opposition would be able 
to check on the powers and excesses of the BN regime more effectively. Moreover, the 
socialist democratic orientations of the BA manifesto could have been easily mistaken for 
a DAP election manifesto. The contents of the BA manifesto is in line with the long term 
aspirations of the DAP. Given this position, it appears that in the process of negotiations 
for the formation of the BA manifesto, the DAP achieved significant gains as the final 
product, the October manifesto, the DAP had to concede less as compared to the other 
opposition political parties especially PAS. 
 
Secondly, the ability of the opposition political parties to concretize their commitment in 
a joint manifesto with limited objectives demonstrates the tacit neutrality of the various 
parties. The ideological divide between DAP and PAS has been presented in this study as 
the single most factor that limits DAP-PAS association and cooperation. William 
Gamson argues that “mutual goal antagonism lie in the future and the present alliance 
may make both better off.”120 Similarly, Bruce Beuno de Mesquita postulates that in the 
formation of coalitions, members in the coalition need not necessarily change or put aside 
their goals but “ coalition partners set aside albeit temporarily the quest for their unshared 
goal.”121 Examining the manifesto in-depth, the 45 page document made available in 
different languages touches on the core issues of economic restructuring, political 
accountability, the social contract, national unity and democratic aspirations. The 
absences of PAS Islamic agenda in the document should not be interpreted as a change in 
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ideology and long term objective. Elements within the BN such as the Negeri Sembilan 
Chief Minister, Tan Sri Mohamed Isa Abdul Samad used the opportunity to hurl criticism 
at PAS, accusing PAS of merely using Islam to attract Muslim support. The Chief 
Minister stated that the ease of PAS to forgo the issue of establishing an Islamic state for 
cooperation with DAP revealed the opportunistic nature of PAS.122  
 
Thus, it appears that conditions were present in Malaysia which were conducive to the 
formation of a general political coalition. The opposition camp had a strong reason for 
collusion that is the intention to check on the powers of the BN. This desire or short term 
political objective becomes the unifying factor and is akin to the theoretical expectations 
of policy connectedness. At the same time, the opposition camp had reasonable evidences 
based on past electoral performances and current political mood to expect an increase in 
electoral votes for the opposition in general. Hence, a unified opposition is believed to be 
able to achieve a minimalist goal of denying the incumbent BN of a two-third majority. 
The calculations of the day do suggest the opposition camp had sufficient political 
weightage to achieve the limited objective. This in turn satisfies the numerical 
considerations of coalition building. If a coalition is to be formed, than it must be an 
effective coalition with significant political leverage to influence the decision making 
process. In this case, the objective is not to capture or dominate the decision making 
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Chapter Conclusion 
The event in the late 1990s does stimulate the prospects of cross-ethnic political 
cooperation in the opposition camp. As discussed in Chapter 1, the particularistic demand 
of the Malaysian political system calls for political power to rest within Malay hands. 
This condition was recognized by the DAP as revealed by Lim Kit Siang. There was no 
desire to rewrite the socio-political hierarchy. Anwar’s removal from power and 
subsequent harsh treatment by the BN regime gave rise to the Reformasi and later the 
formation of KeADILan, the new Malay based party. The Malay leadership that is vital to 
the formation of a credible opposition grouping to challenge the incumbent regime is to 
be found in Anwar and KeADILan as the political machinery. Furthermore, the entire 
saga of Anwar’s sack from political office and UMNO was a major blow to UMNO’s 
cohesion as party factionalism took a heavy toll on its rank and file. The divided Malay 
political cleavage and the rousing of societal grievances against the excesses of the BN 
government provided the window of opportunity for the opposition to up the ante against 
UMNO and BN.  
 
The DAP’s decision to engage in oppositional coalition building is a calculated strategic 
move to enhance its position in Malaysian politics. The general mood in the late 1990s 
was conducive for the growth of opposition forces in Malaysia. While certain events such 
as the imprisonment of Lim Guan Eng increased the status of the DAP amongst certain 
Malay circles, the Anwar factor was the single most crucial event that facilitated the 
outburst of general disapproval of BN governance. The window of opportunity that arose 
as a result of the increase in opposition activities and cooperation, as well as a weakened 
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UMNO, enabled the DAP to push for its own agenda. The DAP’s action by increasing its 
cooperation with other oppositional forces strengthened its image as a protagonist in the 
fight for social justice and democratic ideals. Furthermore, the DAP in the 
acknowledgement of political realities, attempted to use KeADILan and Anwar as a 
counter balance to PAS growth in the Malay political cleavage.  
 
By participating in the formation of an opposition coalition, the DAP was executing two 
strategic moves. Firstly, DAP capitalized on the political impasse of the day to push for 
greater reforms along the lines of social justice, human rights and good governance that 
was in line with DAP’s party orientations and goals. Based on observations of the general 
mood and feelings of the electorate, the DAP was confident that it was able to expand its 
political base and increase its electoral chances by being at the centre of the oppositional 
thrust. The second strategic move was made on the issue of building a viable opposition 
that is multi-ethnic in nature but led by a Malay front. In supporting the growth and 
development of KeADILan and the cultivation of Anwar supporters, the DAP was able to 
check on the growth and influence of the PAS in the opposition camp from within a 
structured coalition. With Anwar as the BA candidate for the office of prime minister and 
Wan Azizah, his wife and leader of KeADILan, leading Anwar supporters and 
sympathizers, KeADILan as a political party provided the alternative leadership to the 
discontented Malay factions. Besides having a common political manifesto that serves as 
the direction of oppositional alliance, the BA was structured in way that allowed for 
equal representation for each of the 4 member parties. Within the BA there exists the 
Council of Presidents which served as the decision making apparatus of the BA. Lim Kit 
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Siang revealed that the DAP attempted to bring a 3 to 1 vote in Presidential Council to 
pressure PAS to adhere to the joint manifesto.123 In this, the DAP’s fear of PAS leading 
the opposition camp and the push for setting up of an Islamic state would be put in check.  
 
DAP entering into the opposition coalition and even the extended cooperation with PAS 
was not unanimously accepted by DAP rank and file members. In Lim Kit Siang’s words 
during an interview with the present writer in March 2006; 
“…they (DAP members) were quite divided on it actually but at the end decided to take the plunge. In was 
not a 100%, in fact those who decided to finally take the plunge were themselves divided…we felt we have 
to take a calculated risk…” 
 
Party opinion was split, but the leadership of the DAP decided to proceed with the 
cooperation and eventual membership in the coalition as it was deemed a calculated 
risked. The environment did indicate a potential change in the political discourse of the 
day and with the limitations of time, the DAP central executive committee under the 
leadership of Lim Kit Siang felt that it was necessary to strike at the opportune moment. 
By late 1999, there were indications of an up coming general election and thus the need 
and urgency to make the plunge into the opposition coalition and to throw their lots with 
the PAS, KeADILan and PRM. The DAP did not have the privilege to make incremental 
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1999 General Election and its implications to the BA and the DAP 
 
 
After over a year of street protests and high profile courtroom dramas, Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohammad announced the dissolution of Parliament on 11 November 
1999. Nomination day for candidates on 20 November was followed by a nine day 
whirlwind campaign period and elections were held on 29 November 1999. This tenth 
Malaysian general election produced interesting results for both the incumbent BN and 
the newly found opposition coalition, the BA. This chapter aims to review the 1999 
General Elections and in particular the implications of the general election results to the 
unity of the opposition coalition. Though the BA in general performed commendably in 
reducing the margins of victory of the BN, the elections were disastrous for the DAP. The 
chapter would first look at the challenges faced by the BA in its first general elections 
before evaluating the performance of the various political parties and finally move on the 
specific electoral setbacks of the DAP. The chapter will conclude by reviewing the 
implications of the electoral results on the BA and the DAP in particular. 
 
The BN Electoral Strategies 
The BN had two strategies in confronting the BA. Firstly, the politics of fear and 
secondly, challenging the BA as a truly viable alternative. The formation of the BA was 
ridiculed by members of the ruling regime as an opportunistic cooperation between the 
opposition forces rather than a committed electoral alliance. The thrust of the BN’s attack 
was centered on the traditional PAS-DAP incompatibility over their ideological stand. 
The absence of the Islamic agenda in the BA’s common manifesto was used as a fault on 
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the PAS for deserting their long professed objective of the creation of an Islamic state. 
The Chief Minister of Negeri Sembilan Tan Sri Mohamed Isa Abdul Samad accused the 
PAS of merely using Islam to attract Muslim support and in their haste to seek political 
gains, was willing to forgo this close and important issue to cooperate with DAP.124 
Arguing that if PAS could easily dropped its core objective then it could mean that it was 
also playing politics with other vital subjects such as development.  
 
Ling Liong Sik, leader of the MCA on the other hand, urged the Chinese electorate not to 
vote for DAP by citing that a vote for DAP would be a vote for PAS and a vote for an 
Islamic state.125 Ling was playing on the Chinese population’s fear of the creation of an 
Islamic state in Malaysia. The DAP-PAS implicit association with the Islamic state is not 
the first time being used by Ling against the DAP. In 1990, Ling used the same line when 
the DAP was indirectly linked to PAS through their common electoral alliance with S46 
though the two parties, DAP and PAS never entered into any political arrangement with 
each other. Ling claimed in 1990 that “the DAP's alliance with the '46 group and PAS 
would help PAS achieve its aim of having an Islamic state which would not be conducive 
for the multi-racial and multi-religious society in Malaysia.”126 In their attack on the BA, 
the BN focused on the weakest link in the BA that is the PAS-DAP ideological divide. 
By using different perspectives of the same issue on different communal electorates, two 
very different pictures are painted of the BA. In the Malay cleavage, the DAP still had 
shadows of being a chauvinistic Chinese party while the Chinese electorate were 
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concerned over PAS and their intentions to establish an Islamic state and implement 
hudud laws. 
 
The second BN strategy for confronting the BA relied on the long term records of the BN 
as a stable and progressive government. The Malaysian electorate was presented by the 
BN with two choices, that of a stable status quo government or an uncertain and untested 
opposition.127 During the campaign period, the BN used materials that depict the BN as a 
party providing a stable and peaceful environment as against the anarchic pictures of 
street protests and violent demonstrations by supporters of Anwar. Captions such as 
“Don’t Let Anarchy Rule”, “Don’t Let Violence Triumph” and “Don’t Let Hatred Win” 
that appeared on BN campaign materials implicitly suggested to the electorate the results 
of voting for an alternative to the BN.128 
 
Although there has been a rise of political consciousness over the past 18 months prior to 
the general election, many Malaysians especially those outside the urban areas have been 
watching the event cautiously. In the same speech that Ling Liong Sik urged the Chinese 
voters not to support the DAP, Ling said that the Chinese viewed the “Anwar case as a 
Malay affair and would rally behind Mahathir.”129 The strategies adopted by the BN are 
targeted at those who have benefited from the stable and developmental growth of 
Malaysia under BN’s governance. The occurrences of demonstrations and protests do 
mark an increase in political awareness and desire for stronger political participation but 
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is relatively confined to the urban centers and Malay wards. While political parties such 
as the DAP and KeADILan are active in Malaysia’s main cities, the PAS through its 
network of rural grassroots were working the grounds in the Malay heartland. 
Nonetheless, in small townships such as Taiping in Perak, the Reformasi movement was 
more of an event read and seen on newspapers and television rather than witnessed by 
individuals themselves.130 Although there were several demonstrations at the Malaysian 
political detention centre at Kamunting which is located in the outskirts of Taiping, the 
demonstrators were mostly opposition members and activists from urban areas. 
 
The Dynamics of the BA 
Indeed the opposition political parties’ ability to set aside their differences to form the 
opposition coalition is a credible effort. However, the desire to cooperate alone does not 
guarantee that the BA could compete efficiently and effectively as a cohesive coalition. 
The BA did not have the sophisticated mechanisms to work out the political strategies 
and the division of seats for contestation as that of the BN. While the common manifesto 
was hailed as a major breakthrough, the BA suffered its first intra-coalition strive when 
PAS revealed a separate set of manifesto for Kelantan and Terengganu, which pushed for 
the realization of an Islamic state in Kelantan and the banning of gambling in 
Terengganu. The unilateral decision by PAS to announce a differing set of objectives 
from those of the BA common manifesto prompted other members of the BA to reply 
that the proposals made by PAS was confined to Kelantan and Terengganu only.131 This 
action by PAS raised several key and fundamental questions to the cohesiveness and 
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viability of the opposition coalition. PAS’ decision to set a different tone appealing to the 
Malay heartland violates the common agreement that it had with the other parties. This 
was expected in the understanding that each component member of the BA like those of 
the BN, would use differing sets of strategies and highlight different issues when 
addressing a general audience at the national level, as compared to addressing their 
traditional cleavage of support. However, the drawback is that it enhances the criticism 
on the BA of merely being a marriage of convenience for electoral purposes rather than a 
committed opposition coalition for change. Moreover, in pushing for the Islamic agenda, 
the PAS is playing into the BN’s accusation that the DAP is being used by the PAS and it 
is inconsistent in its aims and objective.  
 
The other problematic issue would arise in the event that PAS succeeds in winning the 
states of Kelantan and Terengganu. Should then the state governments of these two states 
be known as a BA government or a PAS government? In the haste of the opposition to set 
up the coalition before the onset of the general elections, these issues were not ironed out 
fully. The main concern at that point was the finding of common grounds and issues 
which the various parties could agree on as part of their common manifesto. However, 
the issue of naming the government as either a PAS or BA government was confined to 
state governments and not the federal government. DAP was aware of the complications 
that might arise if PAS was to dominate parliament but was comforted in the knowledge 
that the PAS was not contesting enough parliamentary seats to dominate parliament. 
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The BN’s formula of success lies in the abilities of the component members such as 
UMNO, MCA, MIC and Gerakan to coordinate a holistic elections strategy. By 
dispensing wards for competition amongst themselves, the various parties do not compete 
against each other but maximize their resources by concentrating in wards which they are 
most strong in. Although the BA was not able to replicate the BN’s strategy, the BA did 
fairly well to allocate wards for competition. Most contests in the 10th General Election 
were direct competitions between BN and BA candidates. However, BA members did 
compete against each other in a handful of seats without seriously affecting the outcomes 
of results except in the case of the Kuala Kurau state seat in Perak where the seat was 
won by an UMNO candidate with 6941 votes while the PAS and KeADILan candidates’ 
combined votes totaled 7273.132 In the only other parliamentary seat where there was a 
three corner fight between BN, PAS and KeADILan, the BN candidate won with 7656 
votes while the combined PAS and KeADILan votes only totaled 3139 votes. It must be 
noted that the BN had the advantage of being the incumbent government. The ability to 
distribute ministerial offices and other appointments certainly is important in the 
negotiation strategies within the BN which the BA did not have. 
 
A Brief Analysis of the 1999 General Elections 
The 1999 General Elections yielded some interesting results for all parties that contested. 
While the BN won, UMNO suffered setbacks in the Malay constituencies while the PAS 
performed well by retaining Kelantan and winning over Terengganu. The DAP on the 
other hand managed to win 10 parliamentary seats but Lim Kit Siang and Karpal Singh, 
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the two chief leaders of the DAP failed in their bid to be reelected back into parliament . 
Overall, the BA did not manage to achieve their objective of denying the BN the two-
thirds majority. 
 
The BN managed to win 148 out of 193 parliamentary seats of approximately 77% of the 
parliamentary seats with only 54% of the popular votes (see Tables 5 and 6, Appendix A 
and B). This was a decline from the 162 seats it won in the 1995 general elections with 
65% of the popular votes.133 The ‘first pass the post’ system in place in Malaysia worked 
in favour of the BN to control parliament. UMNO suffered its most serious setback in 
years where in the analysis of 98 seats with high Malay concentrations, it only managed 
to obtain 54.5% of the popular votes while BA candidates, mostly PAS candidates, 
obtained 45.5% of the popular votes. The winning majorities of leading UMNO leaders 
were significantly reduced as well.134 Mahathir contesting in Kubang Pasu, Kedah had his 
majority lowered from 17,226 in 1995 to 10,138 in 1999. Rafidah Aziz, the Minister for 
International Trade and Industry had her majority lowered from 10,649 in 1995 to 2,774 
in 1999. Even more surprising, Minister of Education, Najib Abdul Razak managed to 
retain his parliamentary seat in Pekan, Pahang, the same ward that was held by his father 
the former Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Razak, with a majority of only 241 votes. 4 
UMNO ministers, Abdul Hamid Othman, Megat Junid Megat Ayob, Mustapha Mohamed 
and Annuar Musa lost their bid for parliamentary seats.  
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UMNO’s lost ground meant PAS gains. PAS was now in control of two state 
governments with a convincing 41 out of 43 state legislative seats in Kelantan and 28 out 
of 32 state legislative seats in Terengganu (see Table 7, Appendix C). PAS won all 8 
parliamentary seats in Terengganu and was in control of 11 out of 14 Parliamentary seats 
in Kelantan, with KeADILan holding 2 seats. The sole BN parliamentary seat in Kelantan 
was won by the defunct S46 leader, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah who had returned to the 
ranks of UMNO and was heading the UMNO/BN campaign for Kelantan. PAS also 
managed to make inroads into Kedah, by controlling a third of the 36 state legislative 
seats. However, PAS in general, could not penetrate UMNO’s strongholds in Johor where 
the BN won all the state legislative and parliamentary seats.  
 




























































































































































90 - 100% 25 4 21 1,069,856 95.0% 826,027 42.4% 57.6% 
80 - 90% 15 8 7 729,412 84.9% 549,291 54.5% 45.5% 
70 - 80% 12 10 2 523,165 76.3% 373,992 53.3% 46.7% 
60 - 70% 19 17 2 888,822 64.6% 624,121 60.8% 39.2% 
50 - 60% 27 27 0 1,741,418 55.5% 1,244,080 61.7% 38.3% 
Total in 
Peninsula 
Malaysia 98 66 32 4,952,673 75.3% 3,617,511 54.5% 45.5% 
 
Source: Biro Analisa Politik, Strategic Info Research Development, Dilema UMNO: analisa pilihanraya 
UMNO 1999, UMNO in trouble trans. Bureau of Political Analysis, Strategic Info Research Development, 
UMNO Dilemma: Analysis of UMNO 1999 elections, UMNO in trouble (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Info 
Research Development, 2000). 135 
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The BA provided a credible challenge to the BN in terms of obtaining the popular votes. 
In the state legislative seats, it won 43.4% of the popular votes to control 113 seats out of 
a total of 394 state seats in the peninsula while the BN won 56.4 % to control the 
remaining 281 state seats (Table 7). At the parliamentary level, the BA won 44.4% of the 
votes to control only 42 parliamentary seats. When compared to the BN who had 148 
seats with 55.4% of the votes, it is clear that there exist strong disproportion in terms of 
votes and distribution of seats. It would be unfair to say that the Chinese community had 
turned their backs totally from the DAP. Although the position of PAS on the Islamic 
issue was a serious concern for many non-Malays, the DAP did perform credibly in 
wards with high Chinese voter populations. For instance, in the parliamentary seat of 
Bukit Mertajam, Penang, which 67.3% of the voters were Chinese, Chong Eng, managed 
to defeat the BN incumbent candidate Tan Chong Keng with a majority of 2,937 votes.136 
In the 1995 general elections, Tan Chong Keng had enjoyed a 12,098 majority in that 
ward. In the constituencies of Bagan and Tanjong, where the percentage of Chinese 
voters being 63.7% and 87.1% respectively, DAP won with commendable majorities of 
2,758 and 4,477 votes respectively.137 In wards with high percentage of Chinese voters 
that the DAP candidates lost, the margin of defeat was relatively small. In Jelutong, 
Karpal Singh lost by 775 votes although he obtained a total of 20,716 votes in a 
constituency of 59,372 voters of whom 75.7% are Chinese.138 Similarly, in Ipoh Timur, 
Perak, the DAP candidate though losing, managed to obtain 23,146 votes as against the 
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BN candidate’s 25,273 votes from a constituency consisting of approximately 85% 
Chinese votes.139 From a survey of these results, it would be difficult to conclude with 
certainty that the Chinese electorate had either abandoned the DAP or come to a 
conclusion that the Chinese were in total support of the BN via its Chinese component 
parties the MCA and Gerakan. If there is anything to be concluded, is that the results do 
suggest that there is a split in opinion even amongst the Chinese electorate.  
 
All in all on the DAP front, the party managed to win 10 parliamentary seats, 1 seat more 
than in the 1995 general elections and only 11 state legislative seats. Lim Kit Siang’s 
foray out of his safe ward of Tanjong into Bukit Bendera in the attempt to gain an extra 
parliamentary seat failed. However, there should be some credit due as Lim lost only by 
104 votes from a total of 49,507 votes cast.140 Lim Kit Siang hailed the election results as 
a “historic defeat”, not only because of DAP’s lackluster performance, but also because 
the BA missed the opportunity to end the BN’s political domination.141 Lim also lost his 
office as the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament, a post which he has held since the 
1970s as the office was given to Fadzil Noor, the president of PAS. However, looking at 
the tally of votes obtained by the DAP across three general elections, the DAP can be 
said to have improved in its electoral performance if the 1999 General Elections had not 
been held in a period of political anomaly. In 1999, the DAP had increased its takings in 
popular votes by over 100,000 since the last general election (Table 4). However, it is 
clear that the BA member that benefited most in the 1999 general elections was the PAS. 
The party managed to obtain close to a million votes which is double the amount of votes 
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in obtained in the previous election. Since the pool of votes came predominantly from the 
Malay-Muslim cleavage, it does suggest the political disturbances in the past year, from 
the sacking of Anwar to the Reformasi movement had greater impact in this ethnic 
cleavage than the other ethnic cleavages in Malaysia. 
Table 4: Votes obtained by DAP and PAS in 3 consecutive General Elections 
 
 1990 1995 1999 
Total Number of votes cast       5,778,876        6,255,061        6,882,869  
      
PAS         375,869          438,109          996,713  
DAP         985,228          723,366          847,388  
 
Source: Hj. Shaari bin Abdullah (chief editor), Almanak keputusan pilihan raya umum: Parlimen & Dewan 
Undangan Negeri, 1959-1999 trans. Almanac of General Election Results: Parliament & State Legislative 
Assembly, 1959-1999 (Shah Alam, Selangor: Anzagain, 2004). 
 
 
Overall, the general election was certainly not conducted on level playing fields. The 
BN’s control of the state machinery and mass media gave it the upper hand. Moreover, 
the short campaigning period as usual was a hindrance to the opposition in mobilizing 
members, securing permits and the “habitual refusal of the caretaker government to allow 
the opposition to use public meeting places”.142 However, the greatest issue of 
contestation in the conduct of the election was the disenfranchisement of 680,000 first 
time voters who registered between April and May 1999.143 This represented a threefold 
increase in the average number of newly registered voters in the yearly voter registration 
exercise conducted by the Elections Commission. The Elections Commission announced 
that it was unable to refresh the electoral rolls in time to include these 680,000 new voters 
for the November elections. Many observers have strong reasons to believe that these 
new voters were predominantly young Malaysian that were expected to vote against the 
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Implications to the BA and the DAP 
 
Khoo Boo Teik postulates that an important factor in the inability of the BA to 
deny two-thirds majority to the BN was the “non-Malay reluctance to vote against the BN 
for fear of jeopardizing an economic recovery that had begun…or to vote for BA out of 
apprehension that a PAS dominated BA would adversely affect non-Muslim interest”.144 
Others proclaimed that the non-Malays were the kingmakers of the day.145 The results of 
the general elections do suggest a serious split in the Malay-Muslim cleavage but it is not 
conclusive of the general direction of the non-Malay voters who appear to be evenly split. 
However, it certainly suggested that the ‘first pass the post’ system worked in favour of 
the BN. Although there is no outright support for the BN from the non-Malay voters nor 
a total rejection of the DAP for its association with the PAS, it is evident that the non-
Malay voters were given a tough choice to choose between an untested coalition and a 
government though authoritative at times, but has been able to provide general stability 
and growth. The DAP in its merit of fighting for equality amongst the races and pushing 
for the furthering of democracy in Malaysia, has never had the experience to run even a 
state government let alone the federal government. Thus the simple tip in voters in favour 
of the incumbent BN is sufficient to grant them victory.  
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The election results have several critical implications to the BA in general and the DAP 
in particular. Firstly, the inability to deny BN its two-thirds majority is a dent to the 
opposition coalition. While the loss of pride is a superficial wound, the greater damage to 
the BA as a coalition is the lost of a tangible point of interest to maintain and strengthen 
the cooperation amongst its component members. In the event the BA was successful in 
obtaining at least a third of the parliamentary seats, the coalition would have achieved the 
status of a blocking coalition. The efficiency and effectiveness to function as a blocking 
coalition to check on the powers of the BN can only be achieved if the coalition remains 
together as a bloc. Any desertion from the coalition would have a damaging effect and 
even more damaging if the deserter moved into the BN camp. However, the BA did not 
achieve this ambition and thus lost a critical incentive to further consolidate the 
opposition coalition. 
 
Secondly, in the coalition that was formed prior to the elections, each component member 
held a status of equality in terms of negotiations and bargaining. KeADILan as a new 
political party certainly had strong potentials while the DAP held the position as the 
Leader of the Opposition in Parliament. In terms of resources and bargaining chips, these 
two parties could stand against PAS who is in control of the state government of 
Kelantan. However, after the elections, the weightage of each component member 
changed to reflect the reality of the electorates’ choices. In any partnership, the standing 
of each member against another is important when it comes to the issue of decision 
making. In the case of a political coalition, the unit of measurement especially in an 
immediate post election environment would be the number of seats that each member 
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controls. KeADILan despite all the hype of absorbing UMNO members and fielding 
established academics and civil society activists, only managed to win 5 parliamentary 
seats. PAS emerged as the default leading opposition party with 27 parliamentary seats 
and the full control of two state governments.  
 
PAS’ brilliant performance in turn challenged the basis of BA’s cooperation. Was the 
PAS’ victory in Kelantan and Terengganu due to the Islamic agenda that the party had 
pushed as a separate strategy from the BA common manifesto? Emboldened by their 
success and the reduction of status amongst the other BA members, PAS was now in a 
good position to dominate the opposition movement. However, it must be cautioned that 
many observers have argued that a vote for PAS need not necessarily mean an outright 
support for PAS and their intention to establish an Islamic state. Meredith Weiss puts 
forth that “voters may well have voted for PAS as a vote against UMNO and the BN 
rather than for PAS’ Islamization program”.146 Whatever the reason for the increase in 
votes for the PAS which translated into tangible parliamentary and state seats, the 
dynamics of cooperation within the BA would certainly change and as a result of the 
changes in weightage and leverage between the opposition coalition members. 
 
The third crucial implication of the election results bears heavily on the DAP. The DAP 
though having maintained its primary support bases and did as well if not slightly better 
as compared to the 1995 general elections, it was nonetheless a political setback. The 
DAP on the advent of the 1999 elections was in the opinion that the political discourse in 
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Malaysia was changing to their favour. The apparent silence of racial politics and the 
positive image of the DAP in cross-communal cooperation with Anwar’s camp and to a 
certain extent the PAS, were impressive indicators of opportunities for the DAP to 
increase their political standing. However, the inability of the DAP to significantly 
increase their presence in parliament and compounded with the defeat of DAP stalwarts 
like Lim Kit Siang, Karpal Singh and Chen Man Hin, was a blow to DAP pride and 
prestige. The DAP had failed to capitalize on the political impasses to convince the 
electorate to vote for the DAP. Lim Kit Siang blamed the DAP’s paltry performance on 
the lies and anti-DAP propaganda spread by the Chinese parties within BN.147 The 
excuses raised by the DAP may have certain truth but clearly the DAP failed as a political 
party to consolidate and increase their support base when the opportunity arose. Taking 
full responsibility for the DAP’s electoral results, Lim Kit Siang resigned his position as 
the party’s Secretary General and Kerk Kim Hock was appointed to replace him.148 
However, Lim Kit Siang’s action is arguably a symbolic move as he remains within the 
DAP’s hierarchy by assuming the position as party chairman, which was recently vacated 
by Chen Man Hin after the 1999 General Elections. Given Lim’s past leadership of the 
party as well as the powers of the chairmanship provided by the party constitution, Lim 
remains an influential figure within the DAP.  
 
In the following days after the general election as well, the DAP was struck another blow 
when the leader of its women’s wing, the Wanita DAP, Dr Oon Hong Geok quit her post 
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over issues regarding the party’s selection of candidates for the general election.149 Oon 
claimed that the party had not respected her position as the leader of the Wanita DAP and 
that the party leadership had failed to recognize the importance of women in the DAP. 
Her resignation confirms pre-electoral speculations that Oon was disappointed with the 
party leadership when she was not given the opportunity to contest in the constituency of 
her choice. Oon chose to remains as one of the three party vice chairmen citing the reason 
that the position was an elected post. It must be remembered that even in the midst of 
Reformasi movement and rise of general resentment against the ruling BN, the DAP was 
undergoing intra-party strife resulting in the expulsion of many leaders and party 
members, some of whom later formed the Malaysian Democratic Party to contest in the 
1999 elections. This latest incident clearly reveals that the DAP has not yet fully manage 
to resolve their internal disputes and the resignation of the party’s top female leader has 
certainly further damaged the DAP’s tarnished reputation in the wake of the 1999 
General Elections. 
 
The recent general elections had also serious implications on the party’s finances. In what 
the Strait Times calls an “emphatic plea for funds”, Lim Kit Siang as the new party 
chairman announced a fortnight after the general elections that the party coffers were 
near empty and the party was on the verge of “impending financial collapse.”150 The 
increase in party activities and publications throughout the years 1998 and 1999 had 
seriously strained the DAP’s financial resources. 
 
                                                 
149
 “Wanita DAP chief quits over selection row” Straits Times 6 December 1999. 
150
 “DAP’s coffers near empty – plea for funds” Straits Times 16 December 1999. 
 78 
The DAP’s poor electoral performance relative to the PAS had ousted Lim Kit Siang 
from the highest opposition post in parliament, the Leader of the Opposition, to PAS. 
Lim Kit Siang’s past history of electoral victories and his party’s “relative strong results 
vis-à-vis other opposition parties all these years had made him the leader of the 
opposition in parliament.”151 With the DAP relinquishing this important opposition post 
in parliament, the leadership of the opposite camps in parliament is occupied by UMNO 
and PAS which has a history of ethno-centric tendencies, forcing Lim Kit Siang to 
caution Malaysians that “a spiral of competitive Islamisation policies” between UMNO 
and PAS may dominate the discourses in Malaysia’s august house.152 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
As a conclusion to this chapter, the 1999 General Election is a watershed event. The 
events preceding the general elections resulting in the rise of contentious politics had 
clearly impacted on Malaysian politics at large. UMNO could no longer boast that it 
commanded the loyalty of the Malay cleavage as PAS rose to the occasion and proved to 
be a serious contender for leadership in Malay Muslim wards. Overall, the winnings of 
the BN in terms of seats were reduced but the BN still had sufficient seats to claim over 
two-thirds majority in Parliament. Though the popular votes revealed a serious shift in 
support away from the BN, it should not be interpreted as a direct rise in support for the 
BA but be viewed to a certain extent as a protest vote against the ruling regime. The 
results of the elections could have been very different if not for the disenfranchisement of 
approximately 680,000 newly registered voters. However, in the Malaysia’s ‘first pass 
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the post’ electoral system, it was not merely the number of votes secured, but how the 
votes were distributed to maximize gains in state and parliamentary seats. 
 
The brilliant performance in Kelantan and Terengganu by the PAS which pushed a 
separate agenda from that of the agreed common manifesto of BA proved to be a serious 
stumbling block to the maintenance of a secular opposition coalition. The DAP became 
increasingly concerned as PAS gained political leverage both outside and inside the BA. 
The DAP lost control of the office of the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament to PAS. 
Moreover, with the inability of the DAP to increase their electoral gains in the 1999 
elections and the failure of its key leaders such as Lim Kit Siang and Karpal Singh to 
secure state and parliamentary seats, the DAP seriously questioned their position vis-à-vis 
the opposition coalition. The DAP did not leave the opposition coalition immediately 
after the general elections. It continued to engage the other component members of the 
BA. However, the issue of PAS’ Islamic agenda and the DAP’s rivalry with KeADILan 
over the Lunas by-elections in 2000 and the recruitment of former DAP leaders into the 
ranks of KeADILan played important roles in the final decision of the DAP’s central 
executive committee to remove the DAP from the BA. The following chapter will look at 












The results of the 1999 General Elections were not favourable to the DAP. Although the 
BN won with a reduced majority and PAS was the only political party within the BA that 
could claim a significant victory in the elections, the DAP was no longer the leading 
opposition in parliament. In fact, there were calls within its ranks to break away from the 
BA due to the tainted association with PAS and its Islamic orientation. DAP leaders 
though aware of the situation, chose to keep the DAP within the opposition’s alternative 
front. However, the DAP’s continued membership in the BA was short lived and it 
formally removed itself from the opposition coalition in September 2001. This chapter 
will examine the factors that led to the eventual move by the DAP leaders to leave the 
BA. 
 
The opposition parties were unsuccessful in the accomplishment of their electoral 
objective to deny the BN a two-third majority in parliament. As argued in the previous 
chapter, the inability of the BA to become a blocking coalition was detrimental to 
coalition maintenance. In the event that they were successful, each component member 
had greater benefit to continue within the coalition than to breakaway. The fact remains 
that the BA did not manage to achieve that goal and hence lost an important incentive to 
iron out their differences and to consolidate the opposition coalition. However, in the 
immediate period after the elections, the BA did not lose any members as each party were 
aware that if they were to pull out immediately, they were open to flak and would easily 
be portrayed as opportunistic self-serving parties by their opponents in the BN. Although 
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there were no desertions, there were tensions between the parties in the BA which 
became public by mid 2000. Earlier, the DAP and the other members of the BA were 
surprised by PAS’ action to have a separate manifesto for Kelantan and Terengganu.153 
Karpal Singh was quick to warn PAS not to allow their success in Kelantan and 
Terengganu get to their heads. This was a reminder to PAS that the BA was committed 
towards restoring justice, freedom, democracy and good governance in Malaysia.  
 
The Lunas by-election 
Problems began to surface between DAP and KeADILan when the issue of by-elections 
came about in the year 2000. In the first by-election after the general elections, the DAP 
had conceded to KeADILan fielding a candidate in Teluk Kemang. However, the serious 
rift between these two BA members emerged when the state seat at Lunas, Kedah was 
made vacant when the incumbent state legislator, Dr Joe Fernandez of the MIC was 
murdered on 4 November 2000. The by-election in Lunas was important to both the BN 
and the BA. BN was in control of 24 out of 36 seats or exactly two thirds of the state 
legislative seats in Kedah. 154  The remaining 12 seats were in the hands of the PAS. The 
loss of Lunas by the BN would not be crucial unless the BN state government decides to 
amend the state constitution. However, Lunas was important because it had been a 
traditional safe ward for the BN and it was more a matter of pride rather than political 
leverage. The electoral composition of Lunas was approximately 43.4 % Malays, 37 % 
Chinese and 19.1 % Indians. The MIC, the ethnic Indian party in the BN had been given 
the rights to contest in the ward despite Indians being in the minority in the 
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constituency.155 In the 1999 elections, the MIC candidate, the late Dr Joe Fernandez 
polled 9,760 votes against the DAP’s M. Kathiravelo’s 5,060 vote.156 
 
Trouble in the opposition camp was centered on the selection of the opposition candidate 
that was to be fielded. The three main parties in the BA, the DAP, PAS and KeADILan 
had their own reasons to field a candidate from their own party. PAS had already secured 
12 out of 36 state legislative seats in Kedah and an additional seat would certainly assist 
PAS in making further inroads into this northern Malay state. DAP had been contesting 
in the ward since the late 1980s and felt it was their right to field an Indian candidate 
from the DAP as it has done in the latest general election. KeADILan on the other hand, 
felt that they were capable of fielding a Malay candidate that would be appealing to the 
majority of the Malay voters in the constituency and a handful of Chinese and Indian 
votes would be sufficient to tip the balance in favour of the KeADILan candidate.157 
KeADILan was also quick to point that DAP’s Indian candidate had failed in 1999 and 
the opportunity should be given to another BA member to compete in the ward.   
 
Insults were traded amongst the BA members and the issue of the candidate’s ethnicity 
became a central point of contestation. Initially, the DAP was to field its chosen 
candidate and in line with its multi-ethnic orientations, was prepared to nominate S. 
Neelamaken . However, elements within KeADILan strongly protested against the DAP 
representing the BA in the Lunas by-elections. The DAP and KeADILan continued to 
push for the selection of their candidate as the opposition representative and in the midst 
                                                 
155
 Shamsul Akmar, “Lunas in the limelight again” The New Straits Times 21 November 2000. 
156
 “Tough times ahead for the Opposition in Lunas” The New Straits Times 9 November 2000. 
157
 Shamsul Akmar, op. cit. 
 83 
of all the bickering, KeADILan’s Tian Chua resigned from his post as the party’s vice-
president in protest against allowing the DAP to compete in Lunas on behalf of the 
opposition.158 Eventually, KeADILan’s Youth secretary Saifuddin Nasution Ismail was to 
contest in the seat.159 S. Neelamaken, the DAP candidate who was to contest the Lunas 
seat, accused KeADILan’s Chandra Muzaffar of being the person responsible for the last-
minute switch. He accused Chandra of forcing the issue to be put to a vote, which went in 
favour of KeADILan.160 The front page of the Malay daily Berita Harian on 23 
November 2000, quoted PAS President, Fadzil Noor as saying that Lim Kit Siang had 
agreed to the selection of the KeADILan candidate which forced Lim to release a media 
statement on the same day to deny that he had ever consented to the choice of candidate 
for the Lunas seat.161 In the same media statement, Lim Kit Siang said that he was forced 
to break his silence over the row within the BA as a “result of pure disgust at such 
unscrupulous politics in the Barisan Alternative.” 
 
Earlier, Wan Azizah was quoted in the The New Straits Times that the “Opposition 
coalition rejected the DAP candidate as he is an Indian.”162 This drew strong 
condemnation from the DAP camp and Karpal Singh referred to Wan Azizah’s statement 
as an insult to the Indians in the DAP.163 The BN joined in the condemnation as well 
when Ling Liong Sik of the MCA said that Wan Azizah’s statement was an insult to the 
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Indian minority and “it's obvious that the party does not respect minorities.”164 Wan 
Azizah claimed that she was misquoted and had intentions to sue the newspaper.165 
However, the damage had already been done and the animosity between the DAP and 
KeADILan had increased. In the DAP ranks, prominent Indian member, M. Kulasegaran 
quit his post as party deputy secretary-general in “protest against what he described as 
‘marginalisation of Indians’ in the Opposition.”166 The DAP branch in Caning Gardens 
Ipoh called for the party to withdraw immediately from the opposition pact while several 
branches in Selangor and the Federal Territories suspended relations with other BA 
component members in particularly KeADILan, and were determined not to participate in 
campaign activities for the Lunas by-election.167 The DAP called for a “cooling off 
period” from its position in the opposition coalition but did urge voters to support the 
opposition candidate in Lunas.168  
 
Despite the enmity between the DAP and KeADILan over the rights to field their 
respective candidates for the by-election, the DAP decided to rejoin the campaign for the 
BA after the DAP had initially closed down its campaign operations in Lunas. Several 
prominent leaders from the DAP such as the national publicity chief Ronnie Liu, Cheras 
MP and national organising secretary Tan Kok Wai, Bukit Mertajam MP and Wanita 
DAP chief Chong Eng and also Lim Kit Siang, was to announce the DAP’s intent to 
rejoin the campaign at a rally at KeADILan’s Lunas centre at Taman Selasih.169 The 
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action of the DAP leaders did not go well with some party members. The Kulim DAP 
branch was dissolved when 286 party members including the party's candidate in last 
year's general election, M. Kathiravelo quit the party after an emergency meeting in 
response to DAP leaders’ decision to rejoin the campaign for BA in Lunas. The members 
felt that they were “betrayed by the party leadership” when they were told to stay away 
from campaigning for the KeADILan candidate only to see their leaders did an about 
face.170 
 
Tensions between DAP and KeADILan were reduced with the surprising victory in 
Lunas. KeADILan’s man, Saifuddin Nasution Ismail defeated the BN candidate S. 
Anthonysamy and Independent candidate A. Letchumanan with a majority of 530 votes, 
reversing a 4,700-vote majority that was achieved by the BN in 1999.171 
 
In a speech at a branch anniversary dinner in December 2000, Lim Kit Siang reiterated 
the DAP’s commitment towards the BA’s common goals and recognized that the party 
had “an important role in the BA to promote greater openness and tolerance for multi-
racial, multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-cultural Malaysia.”172 In the same speech, 
Lim Kit Siang acknowledged that there were differences between the members in the BA 
citing the example of the DAP’s disagreement with PAS on the issue of Islamic state. 
However, there was no mention of DAP’s dissatisfaction with the other BA members 
over the entire Lunas by-election incident. 
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The DAP in Sarawak 
The DAP branch in Sarawak voiced its uneasiness of cooperating with KeADILan. 
Sarawak was scheduled to hold the state election in 2001. In December 2000, the DAP 
branch in Sarawak announced their “unilateral pull out of the BA, calling KeADILan ‘the 
most unfriendly of partners’ and accusing them of ‘stabbing us in the back’.”173 The 
conflict between the DAP and KeADILan in Sarawak was mainly due to the large 
number of former DAP members joining KeADILan including a former DAP Member of 
Parliament, Chiew Chu Sing.174 
 
In early 2001, the DAP and KeADILan had another widely publicized disagreement over 
the recruitment of former DAP members into KeADILan’s ranks. This row was sparked 
off when DAP’s former Penang state chairman, Teoh Teik Huat resigned from the party 
and together with the party's former national vice-chairman and deputy state chairman 
Gooi Hock Seng and former Jawi state assemblyman Chin Kooi Thoon applied to join 
KeADILan in February 2001.175 The DAP was upset that KeADILan was absorbing its 
disgruntled members. In 1999, Teoh had faced an internal party disciplinary inquiry for 
not adhering to a party gag order in the midst of the party purge and the failed ‘Kick out 
Kit Siang’ campaign between 1998 and 1999.176 The DAP was upset with its fellow BA 
member for accepting the applications and accused KeADILan for not adhering to an 
agreement between the BA members on the issue of party crossovers by individual party 
members. Lim Kit Siang pointed out that the leaders of the respective parties in the BA 
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had agreed on three binding principles in April 1999 pertaining to cooperation between 
the opposition political parties.177 The three principles are as follows; 
(i)  To give priority to co-operation and this should override all other matters.  
(ii)  To respect the individual’s right of free association, consistent with the spirit of 
fundamental human rights and the Constitution of Malaysia.  
(iii)  Not to entertain membership application from anyone involved in controversies 
which may jeopardise co-operation between the opposition parties. 
 
The DAP argued that the issue at hand was not about the personal choices of the 
individuals in their decision to quit one party for another but they were unhappy that their 
fellow coalition members had gone against the understanding for cooperation that had 
been commonly agreed by the opposition leaders in 1999. Karpal Singh accused both 
KeADILan and PAS for dishonouring the agreement. PAS was dragged into the picture 
by Karpal when PAS Youth chief Mahfuz Omar made a statement remarking that the 
understanding was no longer relevant and that anybody should have the freedom of 
association.178  
 
Implications of post 1999 developments in the BA 
The Lunas by-election and the crossover of members from DAP to KeADILan reveals 
two critical weaknesses in the alternative front. In the excitement and haste to set up the 
BA, the opposition members were concerned at coming to a consensus on points of 
agreement from which they formed the core of the BA common manifesto. The more 
sophisticated mechanisms related to a political coalition such as the allocation of seats 
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were largely not discussed in depth. The emergence of KeADILan and the desire of the 
opposition not to compete in a three-cornered fight during the 1999 General Elections 
meant that the more established political parties namely PAS and DAP had to concede 
certain traditional wards to KeADILan. This was acceptable in 1999 because of the 
general hype and optimism on the part of the opposition political parties on the potentials 
of KeADILan and the new alternative front, the BA. However, with the dismal 
performance on the part of KeADILan and DAP’s poor electoral results, the leaders of 
DAP found it difficult to further concede seats to KeADILan whenever by-elections came 
about. The rank and file in the DAP have at times been pushing the DAP leadership to 
quit the opposition coalition to the degree that entire DAP branches have criticized the 
national leadership and even going to the extreme of en bloc resignations such as in the 
case of the Kulim branch in November 2000.  
 
In the two by-elections after the 1999 General Elections, namely the Teluk Kemang seat 
and the Lunas seat, KeADILan candidates have been nominated over DAP candidates. In 
the Lunas case, the DAP have argued on the rights to field its candidates because it had 
contested that seat for several elections. KeADILan on the other hand attempted to 
introduce a new system to choose potential candidates based on the candidate’s 
popularity, the voters' composition and the number of party branches in area.179 The 
inability of opposition to come to a compromise resulted in the very much publicized 
disagreement, disgruntlement and disgust between the BA members. Furthermore, 
compounded with the issue of party crossovers, the BA did not demonstrate the cohesion 
and cooperation that is vital for the continuation of the opposition coalition. The enmity 
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between KeADILan and the DAP was more due to their similarities than their 
differences. Both the DAP and KeADILan were portraying themselves as multi-ethnic, 
secular and having reformist agendas although the former was primarily a Chinese based 
party and the latter a Malay based party. The issues and objectives that both the parties 
raised are to a certain extent similar and equally appealing to individuals disgruntled with 
the incumbent BN. As discussed in Chapter 1, the DAP rationalized that those who were 
in opposition to the BN had relatively few political parties to turn to. The more religious 
Malay Muslims were inadvertently drawn to PAS with few going to the PRM. As for the 
Chinese, the DAP was their only choice of party in the opposition. However, with the 
formation of KeADILan, although a primarily Malay based party, an alternative 
opposition party was made available to Chinese who were in opposition to the BN. It is 
this precise similarity and ease of assimilation that many who left the DAP were drawn 
towards KeADILan. 
 
The members of the BA were not in agreement over these matters and what made it 
worse was that often, the myriad of exchanges were carried out over the media. 
Mechanisms of conflict resolution within the BA appear to be either lacking or to the 
point of non-existence. This would be arguably the second critical weakness of the BA. 
The DAP was feeling that KeADILan and PAS were colluding together at the expense of 
the DAP while the PRM on the other hand was relative silent as it did not have the status 
nor resources to compete against the bigger opposition parties. The council of presidents 
in the BA which in theory served as the platform for discussions and negotiations were 
not effective. Opposition leaders were airing their views and responding to each other 
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through the media and press releases rather than through the council. Lim Kit Siang at the 
height of his dissatisfaction with the BA, requested “the DAP Central Executive 
Committee to relieve me (Lim) from all Barisan Alternative discussions and meetings 
affecting  DAP-KeADILan relationship and replacement by another DAP leader as I 
(Lim) find such a situation most disappointing as well as exasperating.”180 Rather than 
attempting to resolve the difference from within the BA, Lim in fact disassociated 
himself from the council and asked for a replacement instead. However, these problems 
that occurred in the coalition maintenance stage was insufficient to force the DAP from 
exiting the BA. The mass resignations and branch protest in the wake of the Lunas 
campaign, although a worrying trend appeared to be largely confined to branches where 
minority Indian leaders were prominent. In the Kulim branch, the DAP’s former Indian 
candidate for the Lunas seat was incidentally the branch chairman. In the six branches 
that decided to suspend relationships with KeADILan at their own initiative, the 
emergency meeting was chaired by T. Kannan, the Selangor state treasurer with S. 
Neelamaken, who was the initial DAP candidate for the Lunas seat present as well. This 
is not to suggest that only ethnic Indian members of the DAP were in protest over the 
issue and calling for the party to quit the BA, but it was an indicator that there were 
elements within the ranks that were dissatisfied with the decisions of the DAP national 
leadership. It was clear that the DAP was not unanimous in their decision at first to join 
the BA and after the 1999 elections and the Lunas by-elections, agreed to the DAP 
continuing in the BA. 
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The Sarawak DAP branch was the first to unilaterally pull out officially from the BA in 
March 2001 citing not the differences with KeADILan as the cause, but the association 
with PAS in the BA. The branch leaders claimed that DAP was losing many supporters in 
Sarawak due to the DAP-BA-PAS connection. The Sarawak DAP leaders argued that by 
disassociating themselves from the BA, the BN could not accuse the DAP of supporting 
PAS and their Islamic agenda and hence, be in a better position to contest in the 
upcoming state elections later in 2001.181 
 
However, it appears that the single most critical variable that has continuously been the 
thorn at the side of DAP-PAS cooperation, is the PAS position over the establishment of 
an Islamic state in Malaysia. These ideological and goal differences between the two 
parties have worked against both parties time and time again. As for the DAP, it was a 
high risk gamble to enter into cooperation with PAS and they were quick to be 
disappointed with their fellow BA member on the eve of the 1999 elections. PAS 
decision to continue to push its Islamic agenda in Terengganu without consulting the 
other BA members and working at tangent to the BA common manifesto was a stark 
warning to the DAP on both the intent and sincerity of the PAS.  
 
Despite the resolution of the BA that it was not standing for an Islamic state, the actions 
of the PAS as the senior member after the 1999 elections were contrary to the pre-
elections common agreement. The DAP was quick to check on PAS and in the weeks 
after the 1999 elections, the DAP formed a committee that acted as a watchdog on PAS 
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policies in the states they controlled, especially Terengganu, the newly won over state.182 
PAS in the excitement of their electoral success quickly announced the proposal to 
implement kharaj, a system of tax on business activities of non-Muslims in Terengganu. 
The DAP was keen to question why this system of taxation had not been implemented 
earlier in Kelantan. Dr Kang Chin Seng the vice-president of Gerakan, the other Chinese 
based party in the BN was quick to make a statement calling the PAS Terengganu State 
government’s proposal on kharaj contravenes the Federal Constitution in particular, 
Article 8 (2) of the Federal Constitution which prohibits any form of discrimination based 
on religion, race, descent or place of birth.183  
 
Throughout the twenty months of the DAP’s inclusion in the BA, it had continually asked 
the PAS to explain their position vis-à-vis the creation of an Islamic state. However, the 
DAP felt that PAS was avoiding the question of its Islamic agenda.184 After the Sarawak 
DAP’s pullout from the BA, the DAP continued in its attempt to engage PAS and the 
other BA members to engage in open dialogues over the issue. PAS on the other hand felt 
that the DAP was over-reacting and even suggested that the DAP should be ‘educated’ 
over the issue.  In June 2001, Karpal Singh had reacted to a PAS statement that reiterated 
the intentions of PAS to push for an Islamic state saying that it was shocking and 
“difficult to understand why PAS leaders must publicly express confidence in the setting 
up of an Islamic state in Malaysia, despite clear provisions in the Federal Constitution 
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that Malaysia is a secular state.”185 At the same time, the DAP reacted with disgust over 
Wan Azizah’s comment that the opposition front is in discussion on the establishment of 
an Islamic state.186 On 27 June 2001, PAS Deputy President Abdul Hadi Awang said that 
the DAP should be given an “intellectual explanation” on the setting up of an Islamic 
State in Malaysia to prevent any confusion over it.187  
 
The persistence of PAS to push its Islamic programme and its insistence on the creation 
of an Islamic state as well as the relative silence from KeADILan and PRM over the issue 
forced the DAP to threaten to leave the opposition coalition.188 The DAP’s uneasiness 
with the situation came to a low point by the end of June 2001. Lim Kit Siang issued a 
media statement saying that “Barisan Alternative is at the crossroads as it is no more 
tenable with PAS leaders openly flouting the BA common manifesto for ‘A Just and 
Democratic Malaysia’ and disregarding the opposition of the other three component 
parties towards an Islamic State.”189 The month of July 2001 saw more exchanges of 
words between DAP and PAS leaders over their differences which was widely reported 
in the local media. It came to a head when the DAP and PAS held a secret meeting at the 
end of July aimed at preventing the breakup of the BA. The occurrence of the meeting 
was acknowledged later by the DAP’s chief of publicity, Ronnie Liu in a press interview, 
but he declined to name the place of the meeting or the leaders that attended. However, 
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he did revealed that the intention of the meeting was to salvage whatever possibility of 
DAP’s continued membership of the opposition coalition.190 
In August 2003, Lim Kit Siang released a press statement concerning the DAP’s exit 
from the BA in 2001 which contained a 5 point “No Islamic State” proposal for the BA 
position.191 The DAP proposition is as follows; 
 
1. That the 1999 BA Manifesto “Towards A Just Malaysia”, while respecting the 
different ideological positions of component parties, binds every party during the 
duration of the BA to a commitment to uphold and respect the fundamental 
principles and basic structures of the Malaysian Constitution and to give the 
assurance that there would be no radical change to the Malaysian Constitution 
such as for the establishment of an Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu or Christian state. 
Any effort by any component party to pursue the establishment of an Islamic, 
Buddhist, Hindu or Christian state will be against the BA Manifesto.  
2. A clear reiteration that under the BA Manifesto, a vote for BA is a vote for 
democracy, justice and good governance and not a vote for an Islamic State  and 
PAS agrees that in the duration of the BA, PAS would at all levels of the party 
join forces with other BA parties to strive for “A Just Malaysia” and not for an 
Islamic State. 
3. BA Presidential Council to be given prior notice of any proposed enactment or 
measure in the Kelantan and Terengganu PAS  state governments which could 
impinge on the sensitivities of the different religions, communities and political 
parties to allow for fullest consultation and agreement.  
4. A special BA committee to be set up to ensure that controversial or sensitive 
pronouncements or statements affecting religious and other rights which are 
against the BA manifesto are only made after prior consultation and to deal with 
cases of infraction.  
5. Although PAS is committed to the objective of an Islamic State, it accepts the fact 
that in a plural society like Malaysia, the establishment of an Islamic State is not 
suitable or practicable.  
 
 
The DAP claimed that its proposal was presented to the BA members in 2001 when it had 
direct discussions with PAS over the matter. Lim Kit Siang said that the PAS leadership 
                                                 
190
 “Two Malaysian opposition parties hold secret meeting over Islamic state” Agence France-Presse 30 
July 2001. 
191
 Lim Kit Siang. Media statement. 21 August 2003. Available at < http://dapmalaysia.org/all-
archive/English/2003/aug03/lks/lks2539.htm>. Accessed on 18 June 2006. 
 
 95 
was prepared to accept points 3 and 4, which dealt with mechanisms within the BA to 
deal with differences and a pledge to have consultations with fellow members before 
deciding unilaterally on issues deemed sensitive. PAS rejected points 1, 2 and 5, which 
were directed specifically at the question of PAS’ ambitions of an Islamic state. The 
inability of the DAP and PAS to come to an agreement over the entire issue meant that it 
was just a matter of time before the DAP breaks off its cooperation with PAS and 
withdrawing from the BA. As revealed by Lim Kit Siang, the PAS was reluctant to budge 
while KeADILan and PRM were unwilling to vote against PAS. Lim feels that 
KeADILan and PRM chose to throw their lot with PAS, because PAS was the leading 
opposition party and they believed that the BA could come to power if they continued to 
play the religious cards and appealing to the Malay-Muslim majority.192 
 
In July 2001, the DAP published a booklet entitled BA and Islamic State which was a 
collection of speeches and statements over the past 2 years that covers the current 
controversy that the BA is facing.193 In the preface of the booklet, Lim Kit Siang 
reiterated that the, 
 
 “…DAP knew of PAS’ ideological stand for an Islamic State and PAS knew DAP’s ideological opposition 
to any theocratic state, but we decided to put aside our difference for the sake of the immediate task of 
saving Malaysian democracy and justice from savage and fatal attacks by the Barisan Nasional 
government…the situation has changed considerably in the past 20 months with PAS leaders publicly 
reiterating their pursuit of an Islamic State…” 
  
 
However, the release of the booklet had no great impact on the situation and relationship 
between the DAP and PAS remained tensed. In August 2001, after many meetings and 
discussions within the DAP, the delegates to the DAP’s annual national congress decided 
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unanimously to allow the DAP’s central executive committee to make the decision on 
whether the party would remain in the BA or withdraw from the opposition coalition.194 
The central executive committee of the DAP announced the party’s formal withdrawal 
from the BA on 22 September 2001, citing the failure of the DAP and PAS to resolve the 
Islamic state controversy, and the DAP’s central executive committee “resolves that it is 
no longer tenable for DAP to continue in the opposition coalition and DAP ceases to be a 
member of the opposition coalition.”195 Some were quick to point out that the DAP’s 
decision were influenced by the 11 September, 2001, terrorist attacks in America. 
However, the DAP leaders rejected this idea and the breakaway from BA was consistent 
with the DAP’s intent and action over the previous 6 months prior to their formal exit 
from the opposition coalition. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
The departure of the DAP from the BA can be explained as the failure of the coalition 
maintenance stage. In a theoretical perspective as expressed by Riker’s disequilibrium 
principle, in minimal winning coalitions, “the systems or bodies are themselves unstable. 
That is they contained forces leading toward decision regardless of stakes and hence 
toward the elimination of participants.”196 In the formation of the coalition, the potential 
members in this case, the opposition political parties in Malaysia, identified each other as 
valuable allies and in their common interest to challenge the BN move towards the 
formation of the BA. However, election results changed the resource bases or weights of 
the individual parties, the dynamics of the coalition inadvertently changed as well. As 
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political leverages were won and lost, so too were the stakes at hand raised and new 
objectives drawn. 
 
The BA’s objective of denying the incumbent the two-thirds majority in parliament needs 
to be reexamined. Is this objective the minimalist intentions of the DAP alone rather than 
the BA as a whole? Lim Kit Siang in a reevaluation of the BA’s electoral objective felt 
that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the other BA component members may 
have had a greater desire than just being a blocking coalition. PAS and KeADILan may 
have felt that the political objective should be the replacement of the BN government 
with that of the opposition.197 However, it is difficult to ascertain if this alternative 
objective was conceived before the elections or only manifested when emboldened by 
PAS’ excellent performance in the 1999 election. 
 
What is to be seen is that there appears to be a divergence in common goal even though 
the common interest, to check on the BN is still valid. While the DAP is contented for a 
slow, gradual encroachment of the BN, PAS appears to desire for a systemic change that 
is to be driven by their Islamic programmes. Thus in a modified understanding of policy 
based theorist’ ‘policy connectedness’, the spatial gap between the DAP and the other BA 
member’s policy direction and interest have moved apart hence making the coalition 
untenable. This contention in the BA in the post election period raised the stakes for DAP 
more than it did for the other opposition parties. 
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The DAP have been defending themselves against various accusations of being a pawn of 
PAS and their Islamic programme. The commitment of the DAP to join the BA was in 
the understanding that the PAS and DAP would set aside their differences for the sake of 
the immediate opportunity to strike a critical blow at their common opponent, the BN. 
However, the rapidity of the decline of the tacit neutrality on issues of ideological 
differences compounded with the lack of incentives to negotiate and the loss of DAP’s 
political leverage proved to be fatal in the opposition coalition, whose foundations have 
yet stabilized. In such a situation, it is argued that the opposition coalition though having 
valid basis for its formation, was unstable from the very beginning. This is evident in the 
various issues and problems that have plagued the BA. From the appearance of two 
contradictory manifestos, the lack of agreed procedures in the division of seats for 
contestations, the inefficiency of the presidential council as a platform for negotiations 
and conflict resolution to the furore arising out of crossover of former members, the 
opposition coalition was not acting in unison and there was more contestation than 
cooperation between fellow coalition members. 
 
The DAP could not make a case that it had lost electoral support for its cooperation with 
PAS in the alternative front. In the 1999 election, the DAP had performed slightly better 
than in the 1995 elections. However, as a matter of principle, the DAP had the perfect 
justification for its withdrawal from the BA. The DAP rationalized that if it was to remain 
in the BA while PAS was continually advancing its Islamic agenda, the image of the 
party as a secular, pro-democracy and multi-ethnic political party would be at stake. Its 
survival and relevance to Malaysian politics outweighs the incumbency of the BN in 
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government. The DAP leadership could not ignore the party’s sour experience with 
members crossing over to KeADILan ,the multiple occurrences of branches demanding 
the DAP’s immediate exit and the dissolution of an entire party branch.  
 
On the part of PAS, KeADILan and PRM, they felt that the BA could still achieve 
commendable result even with the withdrawal of DAP. PAS and KeADILan, was 
confident that they could pry away the Malay Muslim political cleavage from UMNO. It 
appears that the PAS and KeADILan was moving towards each other and away from the 
DAP, forming a new ‘winning coalition’ based on post election calculations. The PRM, 
due to its small size, was largely silent and it later merged with KeADILan to form the 
Parti Keadilan Rakyat. In their new set of calculations, PAS and KeADILan had 
confidence that the BA would still be relevant and more importantly the BA would still 
be a force to contend with.  
 
As a conclusion to this chapter, the forces that pushed the DAP away from PAS was 
greater than the forces that bound the DAP to the BA. The decision made by the DAP 
was rationale and consistent with its long term policies and ideological position. As the 
divergence between DAP and the new PAS-KeADILan faction within the BA grew, the 
opposition coalition lost their sense of common political direction. With no leadership, as 
it was a coalition of equals and with the emergence of a first amongst equals, BA 
members were moving in opposite directions of each other. Hence, decisions were made 
by individual parties rather than a consensus of members, ignoring the objectives and 
goals which the alternative front had initially agreed on. Thus with the irrelevance of the 
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original stake at hand and as each party moved to secured their own position, the BA fell 
apart as the DAP chose to withdraw itself from the BA while the others had no strong 














































This research set out to seek the reasons for the DAP’s involvement in the formation of 
an opposition coalition in 1999. By September 2001, the DAP’s membership in the BA 
had come to a full circle when the DAP withdrew its membership from the alternative 
front. Due to the short span of the DAP in the BA, the departure of the DAP from the BA 
was incorporated into the study as well. Inadvertently, the research had looked into the 
issues and challenges faced by the DAP in both the formation and maintenance of an 
opposition coalition in Malaysia. 
 
The answer to the research question is simply that the DAP intended to capitalize on the 
political impasse in Malaysia in the late 1990s. Events in the mid 1990s appeared to have 
facilitated the growth of cooperation between the varied oppositional forces in Malaysia 
including the traditional opposition political parties, civil societies and the newly formed 
KeADILan. The DAP felt that it was a historic moment in Malaysian politics, when there 
was an opportunity for a multi-ethnic opposition platform to check on the powers of the 
authoritative BN regime under Mahathir. They seized on this particular moment to 
‘experiment’ on oppositional coalition building. This research concludes that the DAP’s 
experimentation in coalitional building as a simple association for political convenience 
and is primarily, a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to the extremely rapid political developments in 
the Malaysian during the late 1990s. DAP’s withdrawal from the BA due to the 
inconsistencies of its fellow opposition members, in particular the PAS, on the agreed 
direction of the opposition coalition marked the end of this experiment. To the credit of 
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the DAP, it must be mentioned that the DAP in their attempt to forge a broad based 
oppositional grouping, had conducted themselves in a manner consistent to their party’s 
ideology and aspirations. The DAP’s decision to first enter into the opposition coalition 
and later to exit the coalition as the dynamics of cooperation amongst the opposition 
political parties changed, can be said to be rational decisions carried out as strategic 
moves for the benefit of the party. The DAP can be considered to be rational as they have 
sufficiently demonstrated that they have subjected their “choices of actions as well as of 
objectives, values and priorities to reasoned scrutiny.”198 
 
By way of conclusion in this final chapter, this writer will summarize the findings of this 
research on the DAP’s experimentation with opposition coalition building and will also 
attempt to offer some explanations as to the challenges facing the DAP and opposition 
political parties in general. Following this, some discussion on the implications of this 
research on the larger theory of coalition building will be made as well. 
 
The events throughout 1997 to 2001 have certainly brought changes to the Malaysian 
political landscape. Since the 1999 General Elections, the DAP has been relegated to the 
back of the opposition front, as the PAS had made the biggest gains amidst UMNO’s 
internal factionalism and the general political dissent in Malaysia resulting from the 
sacking of Anwar and the rise of the Reformasi movement. The DAP, who was at the 
helm of the opposition leadership in Parliament since the 1970s saw their influence 
reduced tremendously after the 1999 General Elections. With the rise of PAS and the 
resurgence of Islam as the centrality of the political contention between the ruling 
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UMNO and PAS, it appears that the dominant political discourse in Malaysia post 1999 
is moving towards a religious discourse, mirroring the competition between the 
hegemonic UMNO and leading opposition party, the PAS.  
 
The DAP is certainly caught between a rock and a hard place. The party is unable by 
itself to single handedly challenge the BN regime and it is unable to join in the opposition 
alliance led by PAS that has been using religion as the bedrock of its political challenge. 
Faced with such a situation compounded by the recent electoral humiliations due to the 
defeat of party stalwarts, the DAP is in search of political relevance as ethno-politics is 
directing political competition in Malaysia to the traditional fault lines of intra and inter 
communal contestations. The DAP’s participation in the BA on the onset of the 1999 
elections can be attributed to the complexities in reading the then political situations and 
in the desire to seek political gains from the situation. The collusion between the DAP 
and the other opposition parties especially the PAS was fueled by optimism, was an 
alliance of convenience. It appears, as this study has demonstrated, the opposition 
political parties cannot move into deeper long term cooperation as historical experiences 
and the very nature of Malaysia’s communal polity forces the opposition parties to move 
in divergence and operate at the peripheries of the political arena. In the quest for party 
preservation and sustenance, the opposition party is forced to exist within its niche 
cleavages and any attempt to move beyond this traditional base of support is often used 
by opponents of the party against them. The DAP, in spite of  all its efforts to portray 
itself as a multi-ethnic and secular political party, is often associated, accused and 
demonized as a self-serving chauvinistic political party. As evident in the media reports 
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of comments made by BN leaders, the DAP had often needed to defend themselves of 
allegations ranging from being a stooge for the Islamic PAS to being an opportunistic 
party willing to sacrifice anything for the sake of some political gains. Although the DAP 
with its departure from the BA may have stemmed the allegations of being in cahoots 
with the PAS to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia, nonetheless this ‘weakness’ of 
being or attempting to be multi-ethnic while working in an environment pluralized by 
strong communal sentiments continues to plague the DAP. 
 
The emergence of KeADILan has also posed challenges to the DAP. Being so similar in 
their multi-ethnic image, DAP and KeADILan have been at odds at each other over 
issues of the recruitment of former DAP members into KeADILan and the rights to field 
candidates as representatives of the BA in various constituencies. This shows that the 
niche cleavage which the DAP calls its traditional base of support appears to be in 
overlap with KeADILan who as a newly formed political party is attempting to locate its 
base of support beyond Anwar sympathizers. This was learnt at a great cost to the DAP 
which saw disgruntled members within the party moved into another political party while 
remaining in opposition to the incumbent BN regime. With an alternative multi-ethnic 
and secular opposition party to the DAP in sight, it is a positive development for 
Malaysian politics but certainly at a cost to the DAP. Previously, the DAP was a natural 
focal point for those who are not in favour of PAS, but in opposition to the BN. This 
ultimately reveals that even with the political impasse in the late 1990s, bases of support 
for the opposition parties had not grown significantly, hence resulting in intra-opposition 
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competition for members rather than an enlargement of opposition networks or the 
growth of opposition cleavages.  
 
The study of the DAP’s involvement in the opposition coalition had revealed the 
challenges that prevents long term cooperation between opposition parties. Malaysian 
political parties are a reflection of the plural society that exists in the country. The 
opposition parties are too distant in their ideologies and orientations that deeply divide 
the opposition camp. Any attempt for the opposition parties to move closer to the other 
faces the risk of being interpreted as selling out their traditional political cleavage. 
Moreover, the Malaysian voters are a sophisticated electorate. The voters are aware of the 
choices that are facing them and they have always taken into consideration the long term 
implications of their electoral choices. The Malaysian electorate have had in the past 
changed their party alignments by swinging their votes from the incumbent to the 
opposition and vice-versa to put pressure on the incumbent government. However in 
1999, Malaysian voters took the safer path by voting for stability, as opposed to voting 
for the unknown.  
 
The inability of the BA to sustain its broad based coalition does not mean that political 
coalitions are not favourable in a multi-ethnic society, such as Malaysia. On the contrary, 
the success of the BN is due to the ability of the leading communal parties to come to an 
agreement at the elite level. As discussed in Chapter 1, the communal elites understand 
that they would benefit more by cooperating together rather to compete against one 
another. Aided by the benefit to be in government since independence, the various 
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political parties in the ruling BN are able to resolve differences by bargaining and 
negotiating. The rewards for loyalty to the coalition and the carrot for resolving 
differences in policy preferences are often the allocation of ministerial offices to party 
leaders. The BN since the 1970s have consolidated the coalition and sophisticated 
mechanisms to allocate wards between parties for competition have been 
institutionalized. It would be difficult to imagine that any of the core parties in the BN, 
such as UMNO, MCA, MIC and Gerakan would move out of the BN coalition. The 
establishment and consolidation of the BN over the years makes it precisely difficult for 
any other coalition that has the capability or viability to challenge the incumbent. In the 
context of the Malaysian political landscape, the alternative coalition must mirror as 
closely as possible to the BN in terms of composition.  It is undeniable that the 
consociational democracy that had been instituted by Malayan communal elites in the 
1950s and consolidated by the BN regime since the 1970s had ensured the continued 
stability and growth of multi-ethnic Malaysia. 
 
The DAP’s reading of the 1999 electoral results was accurate. The strong performance of 
the PAS was not due to the overwhelming acceptance of the PAS’ Islamic propositions 
by the Malay Muslim electorate but a vote against the BN. The DAP was correct in 
cautioning the opposition camp from believing that the opposition could come to power 
by continuing to play the religious card in the Malay Muslim wards. As revealed in the 
2004 General Elections, PAS suffered a huge reversal in fortunes as it lost the state of 
Terengganu and barely managed to retain the state of Kelantan by a mere 3 seat majority 
in the state legislative assembly (see Table 8, Appendix D). The number of parliamentary 
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seats won by the PAS also declined from a high of 27 in the 1999 elections to only 7 
seats in the 2004 General Election (see Table 9, Appendix E). The Parti Keadilan Rakyat 
(People’s Justice Party), PKR, a resultant of the merger between KeADILan and PRM 
had only managed to secure a single parliamentary seat which was won by PKR’s 
president, Wan Azizah. The DAP on the other hand won 12 parliamentary and 15 state 
seats, which was consistent with their past electoral performances in the 1995 and 1999 
general elections. 
 
While in rhetoric the DAP is willing to “cooperate with any party”, the bitterness of the 
DAP’s experience during its period of involvement in the politics of opposition coalition 
will most likely hinder the DAP from joining in any form of electoral alliance with PAS 
or PKR in the near future.199 Furthermore, with the results of the 2004 General Elections, 
the DAP has managed to regain its position as the leading opposition in parliament while 
the other opposition political parties had suffered severe setbacks.  
 
As a contribution to the larger literature of coalition formation, this qualitative approach 
to the study of the Malaysian case attempts to complement the more quantitative 
approached with European case studies that have long been dominant in coalition 
theories. The findings of this research have to a certain degree, conformed to expectations 
of the dominant coalitional theories, namely the numerical based theories and the policy 
based theories. The political parties in this study has been observed to move in the 
direction of forging a political alliance when they perceived that there were sufficient 
                                                 
199
 Karpal Singh, Keynote Speech at the DAP 40th Anniversary Celebrations, 18 March 2006. This present 
writer was in attendance at the event held at the Federal Hotel, Kuala Lumpur. 
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resources in their control to effectively challenge the incumbent regime. This is in line 
with the expectations of numerical based theories that places great importance on the 
relationship between the quantification of resource bases and coalitional formation. As 
the players calculate their strengths and identify partners to effect an alliance, the desire 
to collude stems from the expectation of gains or payoffs from a successful venture. In 
the context of this study, the DAP and the other opposition parties were optimistic of 
their abilities as the political developments in the late 1990s appeared to favour them and 
there existed as well, the opportunity to strike at the incumbent in their moment of 
weakness. 
 
This research has also conformed to the expectations of policy based theories. Although, 
policy based theories have focused predominantly on policy positions and ideological 
orientations of political parties to predict the possibilities of cooperation between parties, 
this research has offered a slight modification and puts forward the proposition that 
commonality in goals that need not necessarily be limited governmental policies and 
ideology, could effectively foster the development of linkages that may lead to coalition 
formation. The opposition parties in Malaysia, though originating from different 
cleavages and having differing if not conflicting ideologies, were united in their 
aspirations to challenge the incumbent BN. The current coalition building theories do 
possess the explanatory powers to explain the DAP’s eventual breakaway from the BA. 
Common to both numerical and policy based theories, it is in the expectation that the 
coalition members are able to set aside albeit temporarily, their unshared goals in the 
common understanding that current cooperation will bring about mutual gains and 
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contestation on unshared goals are issues of the future. The BA with the inclusion of the 
DAP in its ranks was a short lived coalition for the very fact that certain members of the 
coalition, PAS to be specific, defaulted from the BA’s shared goals and objectives as it 
perceived that the key to its political success is to be found in an Islamic ideologue. This 
blatant and glaring departure from the initial BA common manifesto is arguably the 
single most important factor that drove the DAP to terminate its membership in the BA. 
As the neutrality of the members on unshared goals and objectives ceased, and 
compounded with uneven electoral gains in the 1999 General Elections, the coalition 
maintenance stage of the BA failed miserably and the opposition coalition spiraled 
downwards to the eventual exit of the DAP.  
 
In the context of a post colonial multi-ethnic state, the primary considerations of coalition 
formations such as the numerical criterion and policy criterion of coalition formation 
must be complemented with local particularistic constraints which forms the basis of this 
study’s research framework. For the case of Malaysia, political leadership must reside in 
the hands of the Malays who are considered as the primordial owners of the state, hence 
the term bumiputera, which literally means son of the earth. The dependency of 
contemporary politics on past experiences calls for the understanding of historical 
development in order to understand current events. In plural societies, such as that in 
Malaysia, a successful coalition’s membership must reflect the societal composition, 
which it is operating in. Moreover, in post colonial states, the political parties that first 
inherit the state from their colonial masters have the added advantage of being able to 
create the electoral system which it in turn is able to fully exploit it for their own gains. 
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With the dominant coalition in place, opposition political parties face difficulties in 
forming an alternative coalition, especially if the opposition political parties themselves 
are polarized in the first place. When challenging the incumbent as individuals, the 
opposition parties are easily demonized and their threats reduced to a minimum because 
the incumbent regime’s broad base of support is able to absorb such challenges by 
bolstering the regime’s component member support for each other and also by playing 
the opposition one against the other.  
 
This study has demonstrated the viability of combining both numerical and policy based 
theories to the particularistic constraints of individual case studies to generate a more 
meaningful understanding of oppositional coalitional building in Malaysia. What is 
obtained is not merely and explanation of the why and how of opposition cooperation in 
the late 1990s, but also perceptive on the constraints facing in particular the DAP and the 
opposition political parties in general. This study can then serve as groundwork to 
understand the political developments in Malaysia concerning the DAP and the other 
parties that are in opposition to the BN.  
 
As a conclusion to this study, it is suggested that further research be done on the 
opposition coalition formation in Malaysia. Hopefully, by focusing on the DAP this 
research alone has provided an initial foothold to the more complex question of 
opposition coalition, which would involve the deeper study of the other opposition 
parties, namely the PAS and KeADILan. This research, while having shed light on the 
DAP’s decision to enter the BA coalition and its eventual departure from the coalition, 
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can be further expanded to include the decision making strategy of the PAS and 
KeADILan to obtain a greater understanding of opposition politics in the tumultuous 
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Perlis 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Kedah 15 7 0 0 0 7 8 0 0 0 8 
Kelantan 14 1 0 0 0 1 10 3 0 0 13 
Terengganu 8 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 0 0 8 
Pulau Pinang 11 3 1 2 0 6 0 1 4 0 5 
Perak 23 9 6 3 2 20 2 0 1 0 3 
Pahang 11 8 3 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 
Selangor 17 8 6 0 3 17 0 0 0 0 0 
Kuala Lumpur 10 3 1 2 0 6 0 0 4 0 4 
N. Sembilan 7 4 2 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Melaka 5 3 1 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 1 
Johor 20 13 6 0 1 20 0 0 0 0 0 
Peninsula 
Malaysia 144 62 26 7 7 102 27 5 10 0 42 


















































Sabah/Labuan 21 12 3 2 1 1 18 0 3   

















































   
Sarawak 28 10 7 6 4 1 28 0    







Won by other 
opposition 3 
 
Source: Biro Analisa Politik, Strategic Info Research Development, Dilema UMNO: analisa pilihanraya 
UMNO 1999, UMNO in trouble (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Info Research Development, 2000). 
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Perlis 105,733 83,607 82,270 1,337 46,212 36,058 0 
Kedah 765,028 578,278 566,139 12,139 315,622 250,454 0 
Kelantan 641,754 489,810 480,659 9,151 187,102 292,874 683 
Terengganu 387,339 314,947 309,642 5,305 127,700 181,767 175 
Pulau 
Pinang 653,572 492,969 482,582 10,387 247,870 233,770 942 
Perak 1,159,858 768,474 748,055 20,419 415,112 329,631 3,312 
Pahang 522,871 385,295 374,775 10,520 215,294 159,481 0 
Selangor 1,195,278 877,300 858,952 18,348 470,248 384,859 3,845 
Kuala 
Lumpur 627,377 443,213 439,113 4,100 220,492 216,829 1,792 
N. Sembilan 405,531 293,064 284,069 8,995 168,185 115,884 0 
Melaka 313,676 241,137 234,704 6,433 132,803 101,901 0 
Johor 1,190,400 861,198 837,992 23,206 611,053 226,939 0 
Peninsula 
Malaysia 7,968,417 5,829,292 5,698,952 130,340 3,157,693 2,530,447 10,749 
      
  
Percentage of valid votes 
obtained 55.4% 44.4% 0.2% 
 
Source: Biro Analisa Politik, Strategic Info Research Development, Dilema UMNO: analisa pilihanraya 









































































































Perlis 15 12 3 84,181 1,826 46,134 36,221 0 
Kedah 36 24 12 577,272 14,085 311,647 249,974 2422 
Kelantan 43 2 41 490,209 10,262 183,863 295,984 72 
Terengganu 32 4 28 316,288 7,101 128,912 180,239 66 
Pulau 
Pinang 33 30 3 491,352 10,555 282,191 198,595 0 
Perak 52 44 8 765,013 20,702 412,131 329,792 1439 
Pahang 38 30 8 381,257 11,513 203,016 166,295 432 
Selangor 48 42 6 872,982 19,169 483,322 367,066 3425 
N. Sembilan 32 32 0 292,450 8,646 170,735 112,345 378 
Melaka 25 21 4 239,296 5,509 134,210 99,579 0 
Johor 40 40 0 828,142 26,220 578,857 222,522 543 
Total 394 281 113 5,338,442 135,588 2,935,018 2,258,612 8777 
  
Percentage of valid votes obtained 56.4% 43.4% 0.2% 
 
Source: Biro Analisa Politik, Strategic Info Research Development, Dilema UMNO: analisa pilihanraya 















 Table 8: 2004 Malaysian General Election results 
 
PARLIAMENT STATE 
 State BN OPP OTH BN OPP OTH 
F.T. Kuala Lumpur  7 4 - - - - 
F.T. Labuan  1 - - - - - 
F.T. Putrajaya   1 - - - - - 
Johor  26 - - 55 1 - 
Kedah   14 1 - 31 5 - 
Kelantan  8 6 - 21 24 - 
Malacca   6 - - 26 2 - 
Negri Sembilan  8 - - 34 2 - 
Pahang   14 - - 41 1 - 
Penang  8 5 - 38 2 - 
Perak   21 3 - 52 7 - 
Perlis  3 - - 14 1 - 
Sabah   24 - 1 59 - 1 
Sarawak   27 1 - - - - 
Selangor   22 - - 54 2 - 
Terengganu  8 - - 28 4 - 
Total 198 20 1 453 51 1 
    
 
Source: The Star Online: Malaysia Election 2004. Was available at < http://thestar.com.my/election2004>. 


























 Table 9: Distribution of seat by Political Parties in 2004 General Elections 
 
Political Parties Parliament State 
BN 
     
Parliament - 198 
seats GER 10 30 
State - 453 seats LDP - 3 
  MCA 31 76 
  MIC 9 19 
  PBB 11 - 
  PBDS 6 - 
  PBRS 1 1 
  PBS 4 13 
  PPP 1 - 
  SAPP 2 4 
  SPDP 4 - 
  SUPP 6 - 
  UMNO 109 302 
  UPKO 4 5 
INDEPENDENT 
      
Parliament - 1 
seats IND 1 1 
State - 1 seats 
    
OPPOSITION 
      
Parliament - 20 
seats DAP 12 15 
State - 51 seats KEADILAN 1 - 
  PAS 7 36 
 
Source: The Star Online: Malaysia Election 2004. Was available at < http://thestar.com.my/election2004>. 
Accessed 5 April 2006. 
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